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The content-based/content-neutral distinction plays a central
role in contemporary first amendment jurisprudence. This article
explores the nature of content-neutral review.1 Part I examines the
mass of doctrine developed by the Supreme Court and identifies
three distinct standards that the Court employs to test the constitutionality of content-neutral restrictions. Part II explores the theoretical and pragmatic bases of the Court's content-based/contentneutral distinction. Part III identifies the specific concern that
most centrally defines the Court's analysis of content-neutral restrictions and examines the three distinct standards of contentneutral analysis in the light of that concern. Part IV explores a
number of secondary concerns that tend in practice to alter the
standards of content-neutral review. The primary goal of this article is to explain, to the extent possible, the Court's content-neutral
jurisprudence in terms of a coherent, principled set of concerns
and to identify those specific decisions that cannot be explained in
such terms.
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Amendment, 25 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 189 (1983) ("Content Regulation"); Geoffrey R. Stone,
Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 81 (1978) ("Subject-Matter Restrictions"). See also Geoffrey R.
Stone, Anti-Pornography Legislation as Viewpoint-Discrimination, 9 Harv. J. L. & Publ.
Pol'y 461 (1986) ("Anti-Pornography Legislation"); Geoffrey R. Stone and William P. Marshall, Brown v. Socialist Workers: Inequality as a Command of the First Amendment, 1983
S. Ct. Rev. 583. For additional commentary on the distinction, see, e.g., Thomas I. Emerson,
First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 Cal. L. Rev. 422 (1980); Daniel A.
Farber, Content Regulation and the First Amendment. A Revisionist View, 68 Georgetown
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I.

CONTENT-BASED

AND CONTENT-NEUTRAL RESTRICTIONS:

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A.

Content-Based Restrictions

Content-based restrictions limit communication because of the
message it conveys. Laws that prohibit seditious libel, ban the publication of confidential information, forbid the hiring of teachers
who advocate violent overthrow of the government, or outlaw the
display of the swastika in certain neighborhoods are examples of
content-based restrictions. To test the constitutionality of such
laws, the Court first determines whether the speech restricted occupies only a "subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values."'2 If so, the Court engages in a form of "categorical
balancing," 3 through which it defines the precise circumstances in
4
which each category of "low-value" speech may be restricted. If
2 Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978). The "two-level" theory
first appeared in the famous dictum of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72
(1942), that "certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech ... are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that
any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality." Over the years, the Court has held that several classes of speech have
only "low" first amendment value, including express incitement, see Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494, 544-46 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); obscenity, see Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973); false statements of fact, see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974); commercial advertising, see Va. Pharmacy Bd.v. Va. Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976); "fighting words," see Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. 568, 572; and
child pornography, see New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763 (1982). For a thoughtful analysis of the concept of low-value speech, see Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First
Amendment, 1986 Duke L. J. 589.
3 "Categorical" or "definitional" balancing is the phrase ordinarily used to define the
Court's content-based jurisprudence. Under this approach, the Court strictly scrutinizes all
content-based restrictions except for those directed at carefully defined categories of lowvalue speech. See generally Melville B. Nimmer, Nimmer on Freedom of Speech § 2.03
(1984) ("Nimmer on Freedom of Speech").
4 In attempting to strike an appropriate balance for each class of low-value speech, the
Court considers a number of factors, including the relative value of the speech and the risk
of inadvertently chilling "high" value expression. Applying this approach, the Court has
articulated quite different standards for different classes of low-value speech. Express incitement, for example, may be suppressed only if it is "directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). Commercial speech, on the other hand, may be suppressed if
it is false or misleading, or if the restriction directly advances a substantial governmental
interest and is "not more extensive than is necessary" to achieve that interest. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). And obscenity, which is
perhaps the least protected class of low-value expression, may be suppressed whenever a
relatively undemanding scienter requirement is satisfied. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 60 (1973). The concept of low-value speech is examined in Geoffrey R.
Stone, Louis M. Seidman, Cass R. Sunstein, and Mark V. Tushnet, Constitutional Law ch.
VII-D at 1058-1169 (1986).
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the Court finds that the restricted speech does not occupy a
"subordinate position in the scale of first amendment values," it
accords the speech virtually absolute protection. Indeed, outside
the realm of low-value speech, the Court has invalidated almost
every content-based restriction that it has considered in the past
thirty years.5 Whether applying an "absolute protection" approach, a "clear and present danger" test, a "compelling governmental interest" standard, or some other formulation, the Court
almost invariably reaches the same result-content-based restrictions of "high-value" speech are unconstitutional.6
B.

Content-Neutral Restrictions

Content-neutral restrictions limit expression without regard to
the content or communicative impact of the message conveyed.
Laws that restrict noisy speeches near a hospital, ban billboards in
residential communities, limit campaign contributions, or prohibit
the mutilation of draft cards are examples of content-neutral restrictions. The Court uses a markedly different mode of analysis to
test the constitutionality of content-neutral restrictions. Because
such laws are neutral with respect to content, the low-value inquiry, which plays a pivotal role in content-based analysis, is irrelevant in reviewing content-neutral restrictions. Moreover, while
the Court strictly scrutinizes virtually all content-based restrictions of high-value speech, it applies a broad range of standards to
test the constitutionality of content-neutral restrictions. In its
analysis of content-neutral restrictions, the Court has articulated
at least seven seemingly distinct standards of review:
1.

Some content-neutral restrictions do not even "implicate"

5 See Stone et al., Constitutional Law at 1035 (cited in note 4).
' The exceptions tend to fall within two categories. First, the Court has upheld some
laws that distinguish on the basis of subject matter. See, e.g., Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (upholding a restriction on all political and public issue advertising on public transportation); Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (upholding geographic restrictions on nonobscene, sexually explicit speech). See generally
Stone, Content Regulation, 25 Win. & Mary L. Rev. at 239-42 (cited in note 1); Stone, Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 81 (cited in note 1). Second, the Court has
suggested that content-based laws may be upheld in special contexts, see, e.g., Branti v.
Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 517 (1980) (party affiliation requirements for public employment), and
has occasionally done so. See, e.g., Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union, 433 U.S. 119
(1977) (prison regulations); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (statutes governing military
bases).
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first amendment concerns.'
2. Some content-neutral restrictions are constitutional if they
are "reasonable." '
3. Some content-neutral restrictions are constitutional if
"they are designed to serve a substantial governmental interest and do not unreasonably limit alternative avenues
of communication." 9
4. Some content-neutral restrictions are constitutional if they
are "within the constitutional power of the Government,"
they further "an important or substantial governmental
interest," the governmental interest is "unrelated to the
suppression of free expression," and the restriction is "no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest." 10
5. Some content-neutral restrictions are constitutional depending upon the Court's resolution of "the delicate and
difficult task" of weighing "the circumstances" and appraising "the substantiality of the reasons advanced in
support of the regulation."' 1
6.

Some content-neutral restrictions are constitutional if they
serve "sufficiently strong, subordinating" interests by
means of "narrowly drawn regulations designed to serve
those interests without unnecessarily interfering with First

Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 106 S.Ct. 3172, 3178 (1986). See also Minneapolis Star v.
Minnesota Comm'r of Rev., 460 U.S. 575, 581 (1983) (first amendment permits newspapers
to be subject to generally applicable economic regulations), and authorities cited therein.
8 U. S. Postal Service v. Greenburgh Civic Assns., 453 U.S. 114, 131 n.7 (1981). See also
United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 178 (1983); North Carolina Prisoners' Union, 433 U.S.
at 130-31.
9 City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 106 S.Ct. 925, 928 (1986). See also Clark v.
Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 308 (1984); Grace, 461 U.S. at 177;
Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); Greenburgh
Civic Assns., 453 U.S. at 132; Heffron v. Int'l Soc. for Krishna Consc., 452 U.S. 640, 647-48
(1981).
20 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). See also United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 687 (1985); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 611 (1985); Community
for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at 308; Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for
Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 805 (1984).
" Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939). See also Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460
U.S. 780, 789 (1983); Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 71 (1981); Martin v. Struthers,
319 U.S. 141, 144 (1943).
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Some content-neutral restrictions are constitutional if they
are "necessitated by a compelling governmental interest"
and are "narrowly tailored to serve that interest."1

The Court occasionally invokes each of these formulations in
its analysis of content-neutral restrictions, but it has made scant
effort to define the precise limits of the different standards. As a
result, it is often difficult to determine where one formulation ends
and the next begins. A careful review of the decisions, however,
suggests that in practical application these seven formulations actually represent three distinct standards, which correspond roughly
to deferential, intermediate, and strict review.
1. Deferential review. In many of its decisions assessing the
constitutionality of content-neutral restrictions, the Court employs
a deferential standard that resembles the rational basis standard of
equal protection review. 14 Under this standard, the Court upholds
content-neutral laws that rationally further legitimate governmental interests. The Court does not seriously inquire into the substantiality of the governmental interest, and it does not seriously
examine the alternative means by which the government could
achieve its objectives. As a result, when the Court applies this
standard, it invariably upholds the challenged restriction.
The Court generally applies formulations 1 through 4 in this
manner. Formulations 1 and 2 explicitly call for a deferential standard of review.1 5 It is thus not surprising that the Court applies
them in this manner. Formulations 3 and 4, on the other hand,
seem to call for more demanding scrutiny. The Court has made
12Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environ., 444 U.S. 620, 636-37 (1980). See also
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976).
IS Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982). See also Roberts v.
United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984); Grace, 461 U.S. at 177; Minneapolis Star,
460 U.S. at 582-83; Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 91-92
(1982); N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438-39 (1963).
1 See, e.g, Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 463 (1981); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Railway Express v. New York, 336 U.S. 106
(1949).
15Rationality review under formulation 2 does seem to suggest some evaluation of the
government's choice of means to a permissible end. See, e.g., Greenburgh Civic Assns., 453
U.S. at 131 n.7 ("government must act reasonably" when it incidentally restricts speech).
Thus, the standard could have some bite if the Court chose to apply it rigorously, as it has
recently in some protection cases. See Comment, Still Newer Equal Protection, 53 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1454 (1986). However, the Court has not yet seen fit to invigorate the standard in first
amendment cases. See Frederick Schauer, Cuban Cigars, Cuban Books, and the Problem of
Incidental Restrictions on Communications, 26 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 779, 788 (1985).
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clear, however, that formulation 3, the "time, place, and manner"
test, and formulation 4, the "O'Brien test,"16 are substantively
identical standards 17 that, in actual application, also call for highly
deferential review.
Formulations 3 and 4 purport to require, for example, that the
challenged restriction serve a "substantial" governmental interest.
In applying these formulations, however, the Court defines the
governmental interest at the broadest possible level' s and then invariably terms any legitimate governmental interest "substantial."" A "substantial" interest under formulations 3 and 4 is thus
one that "has substance" or is "not imaginary," rather than one
'20
that is "important" or "weighty.
Similarly, formulations 3 and 4 purport to require that the
challenged restriction be "no greater than is essential to the furtherance" of the governmental interest. In applying these formulations, however, the Court never engages in such an inquiry. Rather,
as the Court has recently made clear, a regulation of speech "is no
greater than is essential, and therefore is permissible under
O'Brien," whenever the governmental interest "would be achieved
less effectively absent the regulation. '21 In application, then, this
element of formulations 3 and 4 prohibits only "gratuitous" inhibitions of speech.2 2
16 O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.

See Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at 298-99 n.8.
See, e.g., Wayte, 470 U.S. at 611 (use of a passive enforcement policy to decide whom
to prosecute for failing to register for the draft serves the "nation's need to ensure its own
security"); Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at 296 (prohibition on sleeping
in public parks as applied to a demonstration designed to dramatize the plight of the homeless serves the nation's interest "in maintaining the parks in the heart of our capital in an
attractive and intact condition").
"' See, e.g., Wayte, 470 U.S. at 612 (interests in avoiding delay, establishing easy evidence of intent, and promoting deterrence of those who might otherwise fail to register for
the draft are "sufficiently compelling to satisfy the second O'Brien requirement"); Taxpayers for Vincent, 468 U.S. at 806 (the interest in promoting aesthetics is "substantial");
O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377 (interests in providing proof that an individual has registered for
the draft, providing information to the registrant that will simplify communication with his
draft board, and providing a reminder to the registrant to notify his draft board of changes
in his address are sufficiently "substantial" to satisfy the second part of the O'Brien
standard).
20 See Dean Alfange, Jr., Free Speech and Symbolic Conduct The Draft-Card Burning
Case, 1968 S. Ct. Rev. 1, 23.
21 Albertini, 472 U.S. at 689. See also Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S.
at 297; Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 815-16.
22 John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and
Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1482, 1485 (1975). Unlike formulation 4, formulation 3 purports to call for an inquiry into the existence of alternative means
of expression; in no case has it found the alternative means inadequate. In applying this
17
IS
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Thus, although formulations 3 and 4 purport to have some
bite, they are in practice indistinguishable from formulations 1 and
2. The test of a test is not its formulation, but its application. Despite the apparent differences among formulations 1 through 4, the
result of deferential review under all four is the same-the Court
upholds the challenged restriction. 3
2. Intermediate review. In some of its decisions involving
content-neutral restrictions, the Court employs an intermediate
standard of review. Under this standard, which is reflected in formulations 5 and 6, the Court takes seriously the inquiries into the
substantiality of the governmental interest and the availability of
less restrictive alternatives.
The Court uses several devices in its inquiry into the substantiality of the asserted governmental interest: in some instances, the
Court tests the legitimacy of the claim of substantiality by determining whether the government has restricted non-speech activities that similarly impair the asserted interest; 24 in others, it requires the government to present actual evidence of harm to the
asserted interest;25 in other cases, it carefully scrutinizes the actual
operation of the restriction to determine the extent to which it furthers the asserted interest; 26 and in still other cases, the Court
holds that the asserted governmental interest is simply too insubstantial to justify the challenged restriction. 7
requirement, however, the Court has taken an exceedingly generous view of "alternative"
means of expression. For perhaps the most extreme example of this phenomenon, see Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 812 (ban on posting signs on public property upheld in light
of "ample alternative modes of communication" in the same public areas, such as speaking
or distributing literature).
'3 See Schauer, 26 Win. & Mary L. Rev. at 788 (cited in note 15). I could find no decision in which the Court invalidated a content-neutral restriction under formulations 1
through 4. The Court has applied formulation 4-the O'Brien test-to five content-neutral
restrictions and upheld them all. See Albertini, 472 U.S. 675; Wayte, 470 U.S. 598; Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288; Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789; O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367.
2U See, e.g., Schad, 452 U.S. at 73-74 (invalidating a content-neutral regulation because
the Borough had failed to demonstrate that the restricted speech posed problems "more
significant than those associated with various" unrestricted non-speech activities).
28 See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, 106 S.Ct. 2034, 2037-38
(1986); Schad, 452 U.S. at 72-73.
26 See, e.g., Anderson, 460 U.S. at 796-806 (early filing deadlines for independent presidential candidates does not further Ohio's stated interests).
17 See, e.g., Grace, 461 U.S. at 183 (suggesting that government's interest in preventing
the appearance of improper influence on the Court that would be caused by a lone picketer
is too insubstantial to justify restriction); Martin, 319 U.S. at 143 (free speech rights may
not be curtailed if they create only a "minor nuisance"); Schneider, 308 U.S. at 161 ("Mere
legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well support
regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as dimin-
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Moreover, under the intermediate standard of review, the government cannot satisfy the less restrictive alternative requirement
merely by demonstrating that less restrictive measures would serve
its ends "less effectively" than the challenged regulation. Rather,
to withstand intermediate scrutiny, the government must prove
that its use of a less restrictive alternative would seriously undermine substantial governmental interests.28 Under this standard,
the Court may require a real sacrifice of legitimate governmental
interests if that is necessary to prevent interference with first
amendment rights. 29 Intermediate scrutiny often, though not al30
ways, results in invalidation of the challenged restriction.
3. Strict review. In some of its content-neutral decisions, the
Court employs a strict level of scrutiny. This standard, which is
reflected in formulation 7, focuses on the same considerations as
intermediate review, but insists on a compelling rather than substantial governmental interest and requires a showing that the
challenged restriction is "necessary" to achieve that interest. Strict
scrutiny almost invariably results in invalidation of the challenged
restriction. 1
I offer several observations about the three standards of review identified above. First, although an analysis of the Court's
content-neutral decisions suggests that the seven formulations
roughly correspond with these three standards, the Court itself
isbes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions.").
28 See, e.g., Citizens for Better Environ., 444 U.S. at 637-38 (1980) (city should protect
against fraud by requiring solicitors to inform the public of the uses made of their contributions, rather than by prohibiting solicitation); Martin, 319 U.S. at 147-48 (city should protect homeowners from annoyance by permitting them to post signs stating that they do not
wish to be disturbed rather than by prohibiting all door-to-door canvassing); Schneider, 308
U.S. at 162 (city should prevent littering by punishing litterers rather than by prohibiting
leafletting).
" This is not to say, however, that the Court always will require the government to use
less restrictive alternatives. See, e.g., United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 626 (holding under
intermediate scrutiny that the state had employed "the least restrictive means of achieving
its ends"); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27-28 (holding under intermediate scrutiny that the government need not attempt to achieve the objectives of its contribution limitations by such less
restrictive means as compulsory disclosure and laws against bribery).
30 Compare Grace, 461 U.S. 171; Anderson, 460 U.S. 780; Schad, 452 U.S. 61; Citizens
for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620; Martin, 319 U.S. 143; and Schneider, 308 U.S. 147
(all striking down content-neutral limits on speech) with Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609; and Buckley, 424 U.S. 1 (both upholding content-neutral limits on speech). Consider also Preferred
Communications, 106 S.Ct. 2034 (remanded for factfinding showing actual harm to the government's asserted interest in limiting speech).
3' See, e.g., Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 582-83; Brown, 459 U.S. at 92; Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 606-07; Button, 371 U.S. at 438-39. Even the strict standard may not
always lead to invalidation. See United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (unclear whether strict
or intermediate scrutiny).
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does not speak in terms of deferential, intermediate, and strict
standards of review. Accordingly, the Court's opinions do not always fit neatly within these three standards. In some cases, the
standard applied is obscure at best.32 Second, even within the deferential, intermediate, and strict standards, the actual scrutiny
may vary from one case to the next. These are not, in other words,
three precisely defined standards. Gradations exist even within
each standard. It is impossible, however, to define these more subtle variations with any clarity or precision. They are more a matter
of feel and emphasis than of articulable differences in the standards applied.
Third, and most importantly, it has been suggested that the
emergence of the content-based/content-neutral distinction has
produced "a two-tiered approach" to first amendment cases:
"while regulations that turn on the content of the expression are
subjected to a strict form of judicial review," content-neutral regulations "receive only a minimal level of scrutiny." 33 The Court's
frequent use of the intermediate and strict standards belies this
suggestion. Although the Court at times may underestimate the extent to which content-neutral restrictions threaten first amendment values, 4 it does not test all such restrictions with a "minimal
level of scrutiny."
II.

THE CONTENT-BASED/CONTENT-NEUTRAL DISTINCTION

It may seem odd that the Court uses a stricter standard of
review for content-based restrictions than for content-neutral restrictions, since both "reduce the sum total of information or opinion disseminated."' 5 The explanation for this seeming anomaly is
that the first amendment is concerned not only with the extent to
which a law reduces the total quantity of communication, but
also-and perhaps even more fundamentally-with at least three
additional factors: distortion of public debate, improper motivation, and communicative impact. These three factors, which are
32 It is unclear, for example, whether Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, applied strict or intermediate scrutiny, and whether Heffron, 452 U.S. 640, and Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665
(1972), applied intermediate or deferential scrutiny.
3 Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at 313 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See also Redish, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 113 (cited in note 1).
34 See text accompanying notes 134-37 below.
"Redish, 34 Stan. L. Rev. at 128 (cited in note 1). Indeed, some content-neutral restrictions may, more than content-based restrictions, reduce the total amount of opinion or
information made available to the public. See Stone, Content Regulation, 25 Win. & Mary
L. Rev. at 197 (cited in note 1).
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most clearly presented by content-based restrictions,3 6 explain
both why the Court tests virtually all content-based restrictions of
high-value speech with a single, strict standard of review, and why
it does not apply that same standard to all content-neutral
restrictions.
A.

Distortion of Public Debate

By definition, content-based restrictions distort public debate
in a content-differential manner. A law forbidding any person to
criticize the war, for example, completely excises a particular point
of view from public debate. Such a law mutilates "the thinking
process of the community" 37 and is thus incompatible with the
central precepts of the first amendment.3 8 Such a law necessarily
violates the first amendment except, perhaps, in the most extraordinary of circumstances.
Not all content-based laws completely excise a particular point
of view from public debate, however. Some content-based restrictions, such as a law prohibiting any person to criticize the war
within 100 feet of an induction center, are more modest in scope.
But even such modest content-based restrictions distort public debate in a content-differential manner. That is in itself an important constitutional concern. But further, and perhaps more importantly, as a practical matter content-based restrictions cannot be
neatly divided into those that do and do not seriously distort publie debate. The question is one of degree, and such a line would be
extremely difficult to draw on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, an
error in line drawing in this context-misclassifying a "serious"
distortion as a "modest" one-could have serious consequences for
public debate.3 9 The safest and most sensible course in such circumstances is thus to test all content-based restrictions of high40
value speech with the same strict standards of review.
B.

Improper Motivation

The Court long has held that the government may not restrict
speech because it disapproves of a particular message. 41 This pre" For detailed elaboration, see Stone, Content Regulation, 25 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 189
(cited in note 1).
37 Alexander Meiklejohn, Political Freedom 27 (1960).
33 Id.
:9

See Stone, Content Regulation, 25 Wi. & Mary L. Rev. at 217-27 (cited in note 1).

40 Id. at 225-26.
41 See, e.g., Cornelius

v NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 105 S.Ct. 3439,
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cept is central to first amendment jurisprudence. Such restrictions
are inconsistent with the basic purposes of the first amendment in
three ways: they impede the search for truth,4 2 obstruct meaningful participation in self-government, 43 and frustrate individual self44
fulfillment.
The problem, of course, is that the government rarely admits
that it is attempting to restrict a particular message because it disagrees with the ideas expressed. Rather, the government usually
claims that legitimate governmental interests support the restriction. A central task of first amendment jurisprudence is to ferret
out improper motivations when they in fact exist. When a restriction is content-based, the risk of improper motivation is especially
high, for governmental officials considering the adoption of such a
restriction will often, consciously or unconsciously, be influenced
by their own opinions about the merits of the restricted speech.
Accordingly, in review of content-based restrictions, the most sensible course is to presume improper motivation and to permit the
government to negate that presumption only by satisfying the
45
strict standards of content-based review.
C.

Communicative Impact

Unlike content-neutral restrictions, content-based restrictions
usually are designed to restrict speech because of its "communicative impact"-that is, because of "a fear of how people will react to
what the speaker is saying.
This is important because governmental efforts to restrict speech because of its communicative impact usually rest upon constitutionally disfavored justifications.
That is, either the government does not trust its citizens to make
wise decisions if they are exposed to the expression, or it fears that
the expression will offend others and perhaps provoke a hostile au3454 (1985); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980);
Greenburgh Civic Assns., 453 U.S. at 132.
42 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (in
the long run, the best test of truth is "the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market").
43 See First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791 (1978) (in a selfgoverning nation, the people, not the government, "are entrusted with the responsibility for
judging and evaluating the relative merits of conflicting arguments").
44 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (in our
constitutional system, the protection of free expression is designed to enhance personal
growth, self-realization, and the development of individual autonomy).
45 See Stone, Content Regulation, 25 Win. & Mary L. Rev. at 227-33 (cited in note 1).
46 John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 111 (1980). See also Laurence H. Tribe,
American Constitutional Law 580-81 (1978).
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dience response. Justifications for the suppression of particular
messages that, like these, are based on paternalism or intolerance,
are incompatible with the basic premises of the first amendment.
Laws that restrict speech for such reasons are thus presumptively
unconstitutional. 7
These three factors-distortion of public debate, improper
motivation, and communicative impact-provide a sound basis for
the Court's use of a strict standard of review to test the constitutionality of even those content-based restrictions that do not substantially reduce "the sum total of information or opinion disseminated." s Moreover, because these three factors do not arise with
the same frequency in content-neutral restrictions, they also explain why the Court does not employ a similarly strict standard to
49
test the constitutionality of all content-neutral restrictions. '
III.

THE CENTRAL CONCERN OF CONTENT-NEUTRAL ANALYSIS:
RESTRICTING THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR FREE EXPRESSION

Because content-neutral restrictions are not directed at particular points of view, and thus are usually not censorial in nature,
one could imagine a regime in which such restrictions were deemed
wholly outside the scope of first amendment concern. 5 ° The Court,
however, has never adopted such a view. 5 1 Rather, the Court long
has recognized that by limiting the availability of particular means
of communication, content-neutral restrictions can significantly
impair the ability of individuals to communicate their views to
others. This is a central first amendment concern: to the extent
that content-neutral restrictions actually have this effect, they necessarily dampen the search for truth, impede meaningful participation in self-governance, and frustrate individual self-fulfillment.
17See

Stone, Content Regulation, 25 Win. & Mary L. Rev. at 207-17 (cited in note 1).
Id. at 197, quoting Redish, 34 Stan. L. Rev. at 128 (cited in note 1).
"
Some content-neutral laws may, of course, de facto limit the expression of some
viewpoints more than others. In such situations, content-neutral laws may be the product of
improper government motivation. But a law that is facially content-neutral is both less
likely to have a differential effect on particular viewpoints and less likely to be the product
of improper motivation than a law explicitly directed at a particular point of view. Similarly,
a law that is neutral with respect to content is less likely to be rooted in paternalistic government concerns or amount to a heckler's veto of unpopular ideas. See Stone, Content
Regulation, 25 Wm & Mary L. Rev. at 199-200, 218-27, 234-39 (cited in note 1). I discuss
this issue further in the text accompanying notes 123-33 below.
10 See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (upholding a
regulation of the use of sound trucks on the ground that no "infringement of free speech
arises unless such regulation ... undertakes to censor the contents of the broadcasting").
1 See Tribe, American Constitutional Law at 682-83 (cited in note 46).
'8
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A simple example illustrates the point: "No person may make
any speech; distribute any leaflet; publish any newspaper, magazine, or other periodical; operate any radio, television, or cable system; or engage in any other form of public communication." Such
a law is content-neutral. But it would cripple the system of free
expression. Less dramatic restrictions have less dramatic effects.
The central point, however, remains the same. To ensure "the widest possible dissemination of information 5 2 and the "unfettered
interchange of ideas,"5 3 the first amendment prohibits not only
content-based restrictions that censor particular points of view,
but also content-neutral restrictions that unduly constrict the opportunities for free expression.5
This is not to say that every content-neutral law that restricts
the opportunities for free expression is unconstitutional. 5 Rather,
in recognition that some limitations may be justified by countervailing governmental interests, the Court generally tests contentneutral restrictions with an implicit balancing approach: the
greater the interference with the marketplace of ideas, the greater
the burden on government to justify the restriction.
The Court does not speak explicitly in-these terms. There is a
strong correlation in practice, however, between the extent to
which a challenged law actually interferes with the opportunities
for free expression and the Court's use of the strict, intermediate,
and deferential standards of review identified earlier.5 6 When the
challenged restriction has a relatively severe effect, the Court invokes strict scrutiny. When the challenged restriction has a significant but not severe effect, the Court employs intermediate scrutiny. And when the restriction has a relatively modest effect, the
Court applies deferential scrutiny.
There are, of course, exceptions to the pattern. As we shall see,
52 Associated

Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). See also New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (the first amendment reflects "a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open").
See, e.g., Tribe, American Constitutional Law at 582 (cited in note 46); Daniel A.
Farber and John E. Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum Analysis: Content and
Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 Va. L. Rev. 1219, 1238-39 (1984); C. Edwin
Baker, Unreasoned Reasonableness: Mandatory Parade Permits and Time, Place, and Manner Regulations, 78 Nw. U. L. Rev. 937, 969 (1983); Redish, 34 Stan. L. Rev. at 131 (cited in
note 1).
55 See notes 23 and 31 above. See also, e.g., Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 803-04;
Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 549 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part);
Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 89.
" See notes 14-34 and accompanying text above.
53
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those exceptions are often quite revealing, for they suggest the impact of additional factors that at times trump the central concern
of content-neutral analysis. For present purposes, however, it is the
pattern rather than the exceptions that is of interest. And the general pattern is clear: as the restrictive effect increases, the standard
of review increases as well.
A. The Central Concern in Practice
Although this doctrine seems straightforward, the pivotal inquiry-the extent to which the challenged restriction actually diminishes the opportunities for free expression-is quite complex.
In assessing the restrictive effect of particular laws, the Court considers two separate but related factors: the extent to which the
challenged restriction reduces the total quantity of public debate,
and the extent to which the challenged restriction limits important
opportunities for the free expression of particular groups, individuals, or causes. An analysis of several illustrative cases may help to
sharpen the inquiry and highlight some of the more difficult issues.
1. Buckley. In Buckley v. Valeo,57 the Court invalidated the
expenditure limitations of the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971, which prohibited any person from spending more than $1,000
on behalf of the campaign of any political candidate. As the Court
recognized, these provisions had a severe effect on the opportunities for free expression:
A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can
spend on political communication. . . necessarily reduces the
quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached. This is because virtually every means of communicating ideas in today's mass society requires the
expenditure of money. . . . The expenditure limitations ...
represent substantial rather than merely theoretical restraints
on the quantity and diversity of political speech5 8
Unlike most content-neutral restrictions, which leave speakers
relatively free to shift to alternative means of expression, the expenditure limitations in Buckley restricted "the extent of the reasonable use of virtually every means of communicating information."59 An individual willing to spend $10,000, but limited by law
57424 U.S. 1 (1976).

Id. at 19 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 18 n.17.
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to $1,000, has no ready alternative to make up for the $9,000 reduction in the total amount of his expression. It simply won't do to
tell that individual to distribute leaflets instead. Thus, the expenditure limitations had a potentially severe effect both on the freedom of individual speakers and on the total quantity of public debate. In such circumstances, the Court appropriately invoked the
strict standard of content-neutral review.
The Court in Buckley also considered the constitutionality of
the Act's provisions that prohibited any person from contributing
more than $1,000 to a political candidate. As the Court recognized,
the contribution limitations, unlike the expenditure limitations,
entailed "only a marginal restriction upon the contributor's ability
to engage in free communication."6 0 This was so because an individual wishing to spend more than $1,000 in support of a particular candidate could do so by means other than direct contributions
to the candidate, such as by direct expenditures in support of the
candidate, contributions to political action committees, or contributions to other organizations formed to support the candidate.
The Court therefore tested the contribution limitations under the
intermediate rather than the strict standard of review. 1
2. Button. In NAACP v. Button,62 the Court invalidated, as
applied to the NAACP, a Virginia law that prohibited any organization from retaining a lawyer in connection with litigation to
which it was not a party and in which it had no pecuniary right or
liability. As the Court recognized, in the South in the late 1950s
and early 1960s, the "mere existence" of such a law could effectively "freeze out of existence" virtually all NAACP litigation "on
behalf of the civil rights of Negro citizens. ' 63 Such an effect would
severely restrict the NAACP's opportunities for free expression:
In the context of NAACP objectives, litigation is not a technique of resolving private differences; it is a means for achiev'o Id. at 20-21. The Court also concluded that insofar as a contribution constitutes a
symbolic expression of the contributor's support for the candidate, the "quantity of communication by the contributor does not increase perceptibly with the size of the contribution."
Id. at 21. Thus, the effect of the contribution limitations on the contributor's right of association, like their effect on the contributor's right of expression, was only "marginal." Id. at
20. For criticism of the Court's distinction between the expenditure and contribution limitations, see L. A. Powe, Jr., Mass Speech and the Newer First Amendment, 1982 S. Ct. Rev.
243, 253; Marlene Arnold Nicholson, Buckley v. Valeo: The Constitutionality of the Federal
Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, 1977 Wis. L. Rev. 323, 344-45.
'l 424 U.S. at 27-28. The Court upheld this restriction. Id.
82 371 U.S. 415 (1963).

e' Id. at 434-36.
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ing the lawful objectives of equality of treatment. . . for the
members of the Negro community in this country. It is thus a
form of political expression. . . . And under the conditions of
modern government, litigation may well be the sole practicable avenue open to a minority to petition for redress of grievances.. . . For such a group, association for litigation may be
64
the most effective form of political association.
Button warrants two observations. First, unlike the expenditure limitations in Buckley, the legislation at issue in Button did
not restrict "the reasonable use of virtually every means of communicating information." To the contrary, the Virginia law left the
NAACP and its members free to pursue their objectives by such
alternative means as leafletting, picketing, publishing their views
in newspapers, and supporting sympathetic political candidates. As
the Court recognized, however, these alternatives are not interchangeable with litigation. Litigation is a distinct means of political expression. It seeks to achieve its objectives in a different forum and through a different process than most other forms of
political expression. Thus, the Virginia statute restricted not
merely one of many interchangeable means of expression, but what
in the circumstances was perhaps "the most effective form of political" expression available. The Court therefore appropriately
tested the challenged law with the strict standard of review."5
Second, there were two distinct components to the conclusion
in Button that the Virginia statute had a severe effect on the opportunities for free expression: (1) the law substantially limited the
availability (2) of a very important means of political action. Both
components must be present for the Court to invoke strict scrutiny. A law that has a minor effect on a relatively important means
of expression or a substantial effect on a relatively unimportant
means of expression does not trigger the most demanding standard
of review. 66
Button also raises a question. The Court in Button held the
challenged law invalid as applied to the NAACP. Suppose, however, the Virginia law was challenged by an environmental group
shortly after the decision in Button. Would Button govern? Or
would the law be constitutional as applied to the environmental
group because its need to use litigation as a means of political ex64 Id. at 429-31.
63 Id. at 438-39.
"

below.

See the discussion of Brown and Jaycees accompanying notes 72-73, 75-78 and 92
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pression was not so acute as that of the NAACP? Would the law,
in other words, be unconstitutional as applied to some groups, but
not others, depending upon the relative severity of the effect of 67the
law on the different groups' opportunities for free expression?
3. Brown. In Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Committee, 8 the Court invalidated the disclosure provisions of Ohio's
campaign reporting law, which required every political party to report the names and addresses of campaign contributors. The Court
explained that" '[i]nviolability of privacy in group association may
in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom
of association, particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs.'"9 The Court did not hold the law unconstitutional on its
face, however. Rather, the Court held it invalid only as applied to
the Socialist Workers Party. To understand this aspect of Brown,
it is important to note that several years earlier, the Court in
Buckley, applying intermediate scrutiny, had held that the disclosure provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 were
not unconstitutional on their face.70 The Court in Brown distinguished Buckley on the ground that, unlike contributors to most
political parties, contributors to the Socialist Workers Party might
be deterred from exercising their right of association in light of the
long history "of both governmental and private hostility toward
and harassment of SWP members and supporters. 7 1 Thus, as applied to the Socialist Workers Party, the challenged law had a relatively severe effect on the opportunities for free expression:
"[T]he damage done by disclosure to the associational interests of the minor parties and their members . . . could be significant. These movements are less likely to have a sound financial base and thus are more vulnerable to falloffs in
contributions. In some instances fears of reprisal may deter
contributions to the point where the movement cannot survive. The public interest also suffers if that result comes to
pass, for there is a consequent reduction in the free circula7' 2
tion of ideas.
In Brown, then, the Court recognized that association, like liti'7See the discussion of Brown, Adderley, Heffron, Grayned, O'Brien, and Community
for Creative Non-Violence, accompanying notes 69-73, 101-06, and 110-13 below.
68459 U.S. 87 (1982).
69 Id. at 91, quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
'o 424 U.S. at 68-72.
7 459 U.S. at 99, quoting the unreported opinion of the district court.
712Id. at 93, quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 71.
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gation, is not a readily interchangeable means of political expression. The government cannot eliminate an individual's right to associate on the plea that the individual still has the right to leaflet.
Association, like litigation, is a unique means of political action. In
this sense, Brown and Button reflect consistent applications of the
same underlying principle. But Brown, read in light of Buckley,
also clarifies Button in two ways: first, it makes clear that a law
that has a substantial effect on an important right triggers a more
demanding standard of review than a law that has only a modest
effect on the same right; second, it makes clear that, in at least
some circumstances, the Court will consider the severity of the restrictive effect of a content-neutral law as applied to different
speakers, and thus hold such a law unconstitutional as applied to
some speakers although it is constitutional as applied to others.
The creation of such constitutionally compelled exemptions, how73
ever, is both rare and problematic.
4. Jaycees. In Roberts v. United States Jaycees,7 4 the Court
held that a Minnesota law prohibiting discrimination on the basis
of sex could constitutionally be applied to the Jaycees, who would
not admit women as members. At the outset, the Court recognized
that by "requiring the Jaycees to admit women as full voting members," the antidiscrimination law interfered "with the internal organization or affairs of the group," and that there "can be no
clearer example of an intrusion into the internal structure or affairs of an association than a regulation that forces the group to
accept members it does not desire. '7 5 The Court concluded, however, that the application of the law to the Jaycees did not have a
severe effect on the group's first amendment rights:
[T]he Jaycees have failed to demonstrate that the Act imposes any serious burdens on the male members' freedom of
expressive association. . . . There is . . .no basis in the record for concluding that admission of women as full voting
members will impede the organization's ability to engage in
these protected activities or to disseminate its preferred views.
The Act requires no change in the Jaycees' creed of promoting
' See the discussion of the role of disparate impact in Adderley, Grayned, Heffron,
O'Brien, and Community for Creative Non-Violence, accompanying notes 101-06 and 11013 below. The general problems with applying heightened scrutiny to content-neutral laws
are discussed in part III-B below (at notes 123-33 and accompanying text). For another
general discussion of these points, see Stone and Marshall, 1983 S. Ct. Rev. 583 (cited in
note 1).
' 470 U.S. 609 (1984).
75 Id. at 623.
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the interests of young men, and it imposes no restrictions on
the organization's ability to exclude individuals with ideologies or philosophies different from those of its existing
76
members.
Jaycees thus can be understood as posing an issue analogous
to those addressed in Button and Brown. As in those cases, the law
challenged in Jaycees interfered with an especially important
means of expression. But in Jaycees, the party challenging the law
was unable to demonstrate that the law substantially interfered
with this means of expression. In such circumstances, the Court
appropriately applied intermediate rather than strict scrutiny.7" If
the compelled association had had a more substantial effect on the
right, the Court would have invoked strict scrutiny. Such a case
might arise, for example, if a law required political parties to permit members of opposing parties to participate as full voting mem78
bers in their primaries or conventions.
5. The prohibited media cases. In a series of cases, the Court
has considered the constitutionality of laws that substantially or
entirely prohibit particular means of communication, such as
leafletting,7 9 door-to-door solicitation,"0 public solicitation, l sound
trucks,8 2 live entertainment," peaceful political boycotts, 4 street
87
demonstrations, 5 billboards, 6 and signs on public utility poles.
These cases are different from Buckley, Button, Brown, and
Jaycees because the particular means of expression restricted in
these cases are not as distinctive as campaign expenditures, litiga-

Id. at 626-27.
77Although the Court used terms such as "compelling interest" and "least restrictive
means," id. at 624, 626, its application of the "least restrictive means" component was
clearly less rigorous than is usually associated with strict scrutiny; it more closely resembled
intermediate scrutiny.
78 See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 726 (1974) (upholding a California statute forbidding ballot position to an independent candidate who "had a registered affiliation with [any]
qualified political party at any time within one year prior to the immediately preceding
primary election"); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973) (upholding a New York statute requiring voters to register their party affiliation eleven months prior to the next party
primary in order to inhibit "party raiding").
79 Schneider, 308 U.S. 147.
76

80 Martin, 319 U.S. 141.

81 Citizens for Better Environ., 444 U.S. 620.
81 Kovacs, 336 U.S. 77.

83 Schad, 452 U.S. 61.
84 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
83 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
86 Metromedia, Inc., 453 U.S. 490.
"I Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789.
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tion, or association. It is not unreasonable, in other words, to expect an individual who is prohibited from using one of these means
of expression to shift to another. An individual prohibited from
leafletting may post signs; an individual prohibited from door-todoor solicitation may solicit on the street; an individual prohibited
from using sound trucks may rent billboards; an individual prohibited from using billboards may advertise on the radio; and so on.
These substitutions are not perfect, of course. Depending upon
the circumstances, some means of expression may have special advantages for particular groups, individuals, or causes. But for the
most part, the elimination of any one of these means of expression
is unlikely to cause a significant reduction in the total quantity of
free expression."8 Accordingly, one might argue that such restrictions have only a modest effect on the total quantity of free expression and thus should be tested with the deferential standard of

review.89
The Court has not accepted this argument. Rather, recognizing that substantial or total bans on particular means of expression
pose significant dangers,90 the Court generally has tested such restrictions with an intermediate standard of review.9 1 Several considerations support this conclusion. First, it may be that laws that
substantially or wholly prohibit particular means of expression do
in fact significantly restrict free expression. Although speakers
often can shift to alternative means of communication, the very
fact that a speaker prefers the prohibited means of expression suggests that something is lost in transition. Second, to the extent
" For example, although I have placed the political boycott in this category, it is at
least arguable that this is a sufficiently distinctive means of political action that it should be
grouped instead with expenditures, litigation, and association. I should point out that, in
Schad, 452 U.S. 61, the "alternative means" argument focused not on the ability to shift to
alternative means of expression, but on the ability to view live entertainment in neighboring
towns. Id. at 76.
S" For such an argument, see Metromedia, Inc., 453 U.S. at 549-53 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
11 See, e.g., id. at 526-27, 527 n.6 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 515 n.20; Schad, 452
U.S. at 69-72; Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 824 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also
Frederick Schauer, Codifying the First Amendment: New York v. Ferber,1982 S.Ct. Rev.
285, 301 n.90.
" See, e.g., Schneider, 308 U.S. 147; Martin, 319 U.S. 141; Schad, 452 U.S. 61; Citizens
for Better Environ., 444 U.S. 620; Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886. See also Metromedia, Inc., 453 U.S. at 516, 517 n.22, 517-18 n.23, 519-20 (plurality opinion); id. at 52528 (Brennan, J., concurring).
For a contrary view, see Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, examined in text accompanying notes 178-79 below. See also Kovacs, 336 U.S. 77 (construing the challenged ordinance as a limited rather than substantial regulation and thus applying a more deferential
standard of review).
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that such means of expression are used disproportionately by certain types of speakers or by speakers associated with particular
points of view, the potential distorting effect of such laws is more
serious than the potential distorting effect of laws that regulate
such means of expression in a more limited way.9 2 Third, although
the advent of radio, television, and cable has dramatically expanded the "marketplace of ideas," it remains important to preserve the more traditional and less expensive means of communication, which are most often the subject of prohibition. As Justice
Black observed, such means of expression may be "essential to the
poorly financed causes of little people."9 3 These means provide an
important outlet for unconventional and dissident ideas, and they
may play a critical role in local if not nationwide debates. Finally,
although the elimination of any one of these means of communication may not significantly reduce the total quantity of public debate, the use of a deferential standard of review gradually could
lead to the elimination of many of these means of expression. The
cumulative effect could be serious indeed.94 To avoid these dangers, the Court has embraced a presumption that laws that substantially or wholly prohibit particular means of expression are invalid unless they withstand intermediate scrutiny.
The most significant difficulty with this approach is that it
places considerable weight on the determination of whether a challenged law bans a particular means of expression. This determination can be quite complex, requiring an analysis of both the degree
of regulation and the definition of "means of expression." The first
of these factors is illustrated by Kovacs v. Cooper.9 5 Is a law that
prohibits the use of any sound truck that emits "loud and raucous
noises" a total ban or a mere regulation? At what point does regulation become prohibition? The second factor-defining the means
of expression-is illustrated by United States Postal Service v.
Council of Greenburgh Civic Associations. 6 Is a law that prohibits
the deposit of unstamped matter in the letter boxes of private

92

See Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 102-03 (Black, J., dissenting). See the discussion of Ad-

derley, Heffron, Grayned, O'Brien, and Community for Creative Non-Violence accompanying notes 101-06, 110-13 below.
"3 Martin, 319 U.S. at 146. See also Geoffrey R. Stone, Fora Americana: Speech
in Public Places, 1974 S. Ct. Rev. 233, 234 ("Fora Americana").
" For a problematic effort to address this danger by ad hoc judicial inquiry into the
"adequacy" of the "overall communications market," see Metromedia, Inc., 453 U.S. at 55253 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
" 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
453 U.S. 114 (1981).
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homes a total ban, or is it merely a regulation of the more broadly
defined practice of leaving unstamped matter at private homes,
which might include such means as slipping the matter under the
door, tying it to the doorknob, or leaving it under the mat?
Although these are not inconsiderable puzzles, and may require fine judgments in marginal cases, they do not undermine the
force of the general principle: laws that substantially or wholly
prohibit particular means of expression should ordinarily be tested
by intermediate scrutiny. No matter where lines are drawn, linedrawing problems will arise at the margin. That such problems
arise is not in itself sufficient reason to reject an otherwise sound
principle.
6. The restricted media cases. In another series of cases, the
Court has considered the constitutionality of laws that restrict particular means of expression without substantially eliminating their
availability. In some cases, these "time, place, and manner" regulations serve merely a channeling function and have no appreciable
impact on free expression. A narrowly defined law governing the
issuance of parade permits illustrates this sort of regulation.9 7 In
other cases, these regulations declare certain places off-limits to all
or some means of expression. Adderley v. Florida,98 Grayned v.
City of Rockford,9 9 and Heffron v. International Society for
Krishna Consciousness0 0° illustrate this sort of regulation. 10 1 In
Adderley, about 200 students were convicted of trespass for conducting a demonstration on the grounds of a county jail in order to
protest the arrest of several of their schoolmates who had engaged
in a civil rights demonstration. In Grayned, a demonstrator against
racism in a particular school was convicted of violating an ordinance prohibiting any person, while on grounds adjacent to any
97 See, e.g., Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941). As an example of the limit of
this principle, consider Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967), which held that
a city ordinance requiring that public demonstrations be licensed by the city commission,
which could deny a permit only if "in its judgment the public welfare, peace, safety, health,
decency, good order, morals or convenience" so required, id. at 310 n.1, was sufficiently
vague that it "would unquestionably raise substantial constitutional issues concerning some
of its provisions." Id. at 316.
385 U.S. 39 (1966).
408 U.S. 104 (1972).
452 U.S. 640 (1981).
o See also Albertini, 472 U.S. 675 (prohibiting certain persons from entering a mili-

tary base even for speech purposes); Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288
(prohibiting sleeping in public parks as part of demonstration); Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (prohibiting display of flag, banner, or other device on the public sidewalks surrounding the Supreme Court); Schad, 452 U.S. 61 (prohibiting commercial live entertainment in borough);
Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (prohibiting political demonstrations on military base).
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school, from making any noise that disturbs the peace or good order of that school. And in Heffron, the members of a religious
group were prohibited from engaging in peripatetic leafletting on
the grounds of a state fair by a rule banning the distribution on
the fairgrounds of any merchandise, including written material, except from a booth.
From one perspective, restrictions like those in Adderley,
Grayned, and Heffron seem quite modest. In light of the availability of alternative means of expression, it seems doubtful that such
restrictions have an appreciable effect on the total quantity of public debate. It might be argued, however, that although this may be
true in the abstract, it is not always true in application. The actual
restrictive effect of such regulations may vary from one speaker or
issue to the next. Although rules prohibiting demonstrations in the
curtilage of a jailhouse, noisy protests near a school, and leafletting
on the grounds of a state fair may have little effect on the vast
majority of speakers, they may have a significant effect on those
speakers whose messages are tied directly to the jail, the school, or
the state fair. By denying these speakers access to what are the
most logical targets of their expression, such regulations deprive
them of access to the most important audience and prevent them
from utilizing especially dramatic and effective means of communication. Moreover, because such regulations have a disparate impact
on particular speakers and messages, they may distort public debate in a content-differential manner and thus implicate a central
first amendment concern. In such circumstances, one might argue
that the Court should invalidate such regulations-at least as applied to those speakers whose messages are directly tied to the offlimits locations. 10 2 This argument would extend the principle
adopted in Button and Brown, in which the Court held unconstitutional as applied to particular speakers laws that were otherwise
valid on their face.
The Court has never accepted this argument. Rather, the
Court has declined to hold laws unconstitutional as applied in this
manner except where, as in Button and Brown, the differential restrictive effect is quite severe. Two considerations support this
conclusion. First, the creation of such constitutionally compelled
exemptions converts a law that is content-neutral into one that is
content-based. In Brown, for example, the Court held that the first
amendment mandated preferential treatment for the Socialist
102See Baker, 78 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 973 n.88 (cited in note 54). See also Ronald A. Cass,
First Amendment Access to Government Facilities, 65 Va. L. Rev. 1287, 1319 (1979).
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Workers Party but not for the Republican Party, the Democratic
Party, the Liberal Party, the Libertarian Party, or the Conservative Party. This turns topsy-turvy the usual presumptions of free
speech jurisprudence, and it creates the danger that the exemption
will actually distort public debate in favor of the exempted group.
Second, widespread application of the method followed in
Button and Brown would generate a host of exceedingly difficult
and discomforting questions of application. When is a speaker's
message sufficiently tied to a particular location to justify a special
exemption? Should it make a difference in Adderley, for example,
whether the demonstrators are protesting the arrests of their
friends, calling for changes in ball procedures, supporting a particular candidate for sheriff, or complaining about low wages for jail
personnel? Should it make a difference in Heffron whether the
leafletters are protesting employment discrimination at the fair,
supporting a candidate for governor who voted for extra appropriations for the fair, or espousing their religious beliefs to potential
converts near the health food exhibits? It is doubtful, at best, that
courts should be in the business of making such inquiries when, in
so doing, they will be called upon to draw critical distinctions between speakers because of the particular messages or viewpoints
they seek to convey. Although constitutionally compelled exemptions may be justified when an otherwise valid law severely restricts a particular individual's or group's opportunities for free expression, such exemptions are more questionable when, as in
Adderley, Heffron, and Grayned, the actual restrictive effect is
much less severe. 103
Thus, time, place, and manner regulations have only a modest
effect on overall public debate, and to the extent such regulations
disproportionately disadvantage particular speakers, the restrictive
effect is not sufficiently severe to warrant the creation of constitutionally compelled exemptions. Accordingly, one might expect the
Court routinely to test such regulations with the deferential standard of review. In fact, however, although the Court usually gives
such restrictions only deferential scrutiny, 104 it occasionally invokes intermediate scrutiny as well.10 5 As we shall see, the explana"I3For a more extensive discussion, see Stone and Marshall, 1983 S. Ct. Rev. at 607-13
(cited in note 1). For an analysis of parallel concerns under the free exercise clause, see
Geoffrey R. Stone, Constitutionally Compelled Exemptions and the Free Exercise Clause, 28
Win. & Mary L. Rev. (forthcoming 1986) ("Compelled Exemptions").
104 See, e.g., Albertini, 472 U.S. 675; Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S.
288; Heffron, 452 U.S. 640; Greer, 424 U.S. 828; Adderley, 385 U.S. 39.
10 See, e.g., Grace, 461 U.S. 171; Grayned, 408 U.S. 104.
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tion lies neither in the impact of the challenged regulation on the
total quantity of public debate, nor in its differential effect on particular speakers, but in the peculiarities of the Court's public forum doctrine.10 6
7. The symbolic expression cases. In United States v.
O'Brien 07 and Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 0 8
the Court considered the constitutionality of content-neutral laws
that restricted certain forms of symbolic expression. In O'Brien,
the Court upheld a federal statute that prohibited any person from
knowingly destroying a draft card, as applied to an individual who
publicly burned his draft card as a symbolic expression of protest
against the draft and the Vietnam War. In Community for Creative Non-Violence, the Court upheld a National Park Service regulation that prohibited any person from sleeping in a public park, as
applied to individuals engaged in a round-the-clock demonstration
designed to call attention to the plight of the homeless."0 9
The issue posed in these cases is similar to that posed in Adderley, Grayned, and Hef/ron. Laws that prohibit destroying of
draft cards or sleeping in public parks do not have an appreciable
effect on the total quantity of public debate. These are not widely
used means of expression. Such laws do have an effect, however, on
those speakers for whom the destruction of a draft card or sleeping
in a public park constitutes an especially dramatic or effective
means of communication. 0 The question then, as in Adderley,
Grayned, and Heffron, is whether a law that has no appreciable
effect on public debate should be tested by (a) intermediate rather
than deferential scrutiny because of its disproportionate effect on
certain speakers; (b) intermediate scrutiny, as applied to such
speakers; or (c) deferential scrutiny, because the disproportionate
effect is insufficiently severe to justify either elevation of the stan106See part IV-B below.
107

391 U.S. 367 (1968).

108 468 U.S. 288 (1984).

468 U.S. 609, offers another illustration of this type of restriction. The
Jaycees' gender discrimination in selecting members may be seen as a form of symbolic
expression--"our refusal to admit women is itself an expression to others of our view that
women and men are different in important ways." The Court viewed this aspect of the act of
discriminating as tantamount to symbolic expression regulated in a content-neutral manner.
110 For discussion of the significance of draft card burning as a means of protesting the
draft, see Alfange, 1968 S. Ct. Rev. at 27 (cited in note 20); Ely, 88 Harv. L. Rev. at 1489-90
& n.29 (cited in note 22); Redish, 34 Stan. L. Rev. at 147-50 (cited in note 1); Tribe, American Constitutional Law at 686 (cited in note 46). See also Lawrence R. Velvel, Draft Card
Burning Cases, 16 U. Kan. L. Rev. 149, 153 (1968); Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in
First Amendment Theory, 1977 Am. Bar Found. Res. J. 521, 640.
109 Jaycees,

1987]

Content-Neutral Restrictions

dard of review for the law as a whole or creation of a constitutionally compelled exemption."'
As in the line of cases including Adderley, Grayned, and Heffron, the Court generally has decided to apply deferential scrutiny
in these cases involving symbolic expression. 2 This conclusion
seems justified where, as in O'Brien and Community for Creative
Non-Violence, the differential restrictive effect is not severe and
speakers who might prefer to burn draft cards or to sleep in public
113
parks can readily shift to alternative means of expression.
As the above illustrations demonstrate, in evaluating the concern that content-neutral restrictions may limit the opportunities
for free expression, the Court generally calibrates the standard of
review to the actual restrictive effect of the challenged restriction.
Laws having severe effects ordinarily trigger strict scrutiny; laws
having significant effects ordinarily trigger intermediate scrutiny;
and laws having relatively modest effects ordinarily trigger deferential scrutiny.

II Unlike the situations in Adderley, Grayned,and Heffron, the creation of a constitutionally compelled exemption in cases like O'Brien and Community for Creative Non-Violence might not require the Court to draw lines explicitly in terms of content. In O'Brien,
for example, the Court could exempt from the statute any person who destroys a draft card
for the purpose of expression, and in Community for Creative Non-Violence it could exempt from the regulation any person who sleeps in a park as a means of expression. Such an
exemption would focus on the act of expression rather than the particular message conveyed. But such exemptions would generate a different but similarly troublesome task of
distinguishing "imposters." See Stone et al., Constitutional Law at 1202 (cited in note 4).
112 Although the public forum doctrine has occasionally led the Court to apply intermediate scrutiny in the context of cases like Adderley, Grayned, and Heffron, see note 104
above, it has not departed from deferential scrutiny in cases like O'Brien and Community
for Creative Non-Violence.
13 See Tribe, American Constitutional Law at 685-86 (cited in note 46); Farber and
Nowak, 70 Va. L. Rev. at 1237-38 n.95 (cited in note 54). This is not to say that all restrictions on symbolic expression must be tested by deferential scrutiny. Some restrictions of
symbolic expression may be directed explicitly at the content of the expression. Such restrictions must be tested by the ordinary standards of content-based review. See, e.g.,
Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (black arm bands); Stromberg v.
California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (red flag). Other restrictions of symbolic expression may
have a more severe effect on the opportunities for free expression and must therefore be
tested by more demanding standards of content-neutral review. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (peaceful political boycotts); Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1 (1976) (contribution limitations). And still other restrictions of symbolic expression
may be premised on government interests that pose concerns similar to content-based restrictions and must therefore be tested by an elevated standard of review. See, e.g., Spence
v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (flag misuse).
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Setting the Standards for Content-Neutral Review: Balancing
vs. Bright Lines

The Court's use of balancing to evaluate content-neutral restrictions brings us back to the original question: why does the
Court not use the same methodology in its analysis of contentbased and content-neutral restrictions? Content-based and content-neutral restrictions both threaten basic first amendment values, although they do so in different ways. Content-based restrictions are more likely than content-neutral restrictions to distort
public debate, to be tainted by improper motivation, and to be defended with constitutionally disfavored justifications. But contentneutral restrictions also threaten important first amendment values. By diminishing the opportunities for free expression, such restrictions limit the marketplace of ideas and enervate public
debate.
In its analysis of content-based restrictions, however, the
Court does not calibrate the degree of scrutiny with the degree to
which particular content-based restrictions actually undermine
first amendment values. It does not distinguish among contentbased restrictions in terms of their potential to distort public debate, the relative likelihood of improper motivation, or the extent
to which they actually rest on disfavored justifications. 114 Rather,
eschewing such balancing, the Court tests all content-based restrictions of high-value speech with essentially the same strict standard
11 5
of review.
Three arguments are most commonly invoked to justify the
Court's rejection of balancing in review of content-based restrictions. First, balancing is inherently uncertain. It creates a realm in
which speakers may not know whether their speech is protected.
This inhibits the exercise of first amendment rights.11 6 Second, balancing invites judges to understate speech interests by focusing on
the value of free speech to individuals, as a private interest, rather
than on its value to the community generally, as a public interest
114This observation is explored more fully in part IV-E below.
115 The one notable exception is the Court's occasionally more lenient analysis of subject-matter restrictions, which is the product of generalized judgments about the risks of
distortion, motivation, and justification. See Stone, Content Regulation, 25 Wm. & Mary L.
Rev. at 239-42 (cited in note 1); Stone, Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 81
(cited in note 1).
116 See, e.g., Nimfier on Freedom of Speech at § 2.02 (cited in note 4); Gerald Gunther,
In Search of Judicial Quality on a Changing Court: The Case of Justice Powell, 24 Stan. L.
Rev. 1001, 1026-27 (1972); Laurent B. Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 Yale
L. J. 1424, 1443 (1962).
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that serves the essential ends of a self-governing society."' Third,
balancing invites judges to overstate governmental interests and to
defer unduly to legislative judgments. It thus tends in practice to
legitimate rather than to check governmental abuse." 8
The factual truth of the first argument seems self-evident: balancing is more likely than "absolutism" or "categorical balancing"" 9 to generate uncertainty. The significance of the second and
third observations, however, is less clear. Why is the deflation of
constitutional interests and the inflation of governmental interests
more likely in the review of content-based restrictions of speech
than in the review of other laws raising constitutional issues? The
answer lies in the essential nature of content-based restrictions.
Because such restrictions enable legislators and administrators to
single out and silence those views they find most threatening, the
enactment of content-based restrictions is often closely bound up
with the self-interest and fears of government officials. In such circumstances, judicial deference to such officials is unwarranted.
Moreover, as history teaches, judicial evaluations of content-based
restrictions are especially likely to "become involved with the ideological predispositions of those doing the evaluating."' 2 0 There is a
danger, in other words, that judges and jurors may be influenced
by their own conscious or unconscious biases, which may undermine their ability to evaluate accurately and impartially the extent
to which particular content-based restrictions actually impair the
communication of specific, often disfavored, messages. If the judicial branch is to preserve free expression, especially in times of crisis, against an intolerant and perhaps frightened majority, it cannot rely on a process of review that requires the courts after each
incident to guess at the risks created and "to assign a specific value
to the hard-to-measure worth of particular instances of free expression." 2 1 Thus, in analyzing content-based restrictions, the

See, e.g., Nimmer on Freedom of Speech at § 2.02 (cited in note 4); Paul G. Kauper,
Civil Liberties and the Constitution 119-20 (1962); Fred C. Zacharias, Flowcharting the First
Amendment: A Comprehensive Approach to Balancing in Political Protest Cases, 72 Cornell
L. Rev. (forthcoming 1987); Frantz, 72 Yale L. J. at 1441 (cited in note 116).
" See, e.g., Nimmer on Freedom of Speech § 2.02 (cited in note 4); Martin Shapiro,
Freedom of Speech, The Supreme Court and Judicial Review 86, 89 (1966); Zacharias, 72
Cornell L. J. (cited in note 117); Gunther, 24 Stan. L. Rev. at 1005 (cited in note 116).
11' See note 4 and accompanying text above.
10 Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 112 (cited in note 46).
121 Tribe, American Constitutional Law at 583 (cited in note 46). See also Frederick
11

Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 361, 376-77 (1985); Stone, Content Regulation,
25 Win. & Mary L. Rev. at 225-26 (cited in note 1).
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Court has appropriately embraced a "fortress model" 122 of jurisprudence that gives judges little room to maneuver and that intentionally overprotects speech, in order to minimize the potential
harm from legislative and administrative abuse and judicial miscalculation. By applying strict scrutiny to virtually all content-based
restrictions of high-value speech, rather than attempting to calibrate its standards according to assessments of the relative speech
and governmental interests in each case, the Court has erected a
strong barrier against institutional underprotection.
To some extent, similar concerns exist in the context of content-neutral restrictions. Government officials are usually deeply
committed to the maintenance of order and the conservation of resources. This orientation produces an oversensitivity to disruption
and a restrictive attitude towards nontraditional means of expression. 123 Moreover, such officials tend to be particularly reluctant to
sacrifice public services when "the communication is controversial
or is of interest to only a small segment of the population."'1 24 This
is so not only because government officials may be hostile or unsympathetic to the views of such speakers, but also because as between the two groups whose interests government officials must accommodate-the general public and those who seek to use
nontraditional means of communication-"the political power2 5 of
the former is likely to be far greater than that of the latter.'
Despite these concerns, there are several persuasive reasons
for not extending the fortress model to review of content-neutral
restrictions. First, although the concerns noted above undoubtedly
exist, they are not as powerful as the concerns that exist in the
context of content-based restrictions. Government officials are
more likely to undervalue first amendment interests and overvalue
governmental interests when they enact laws that exclude Communists from public employment or ban Nazi demonstrations than
when they enact laws prohibiting all billboards or forbidding all
leafletting at a state fair. The biases cut in the same direction, but
they arise less frequently and have less force in the context of con-

122

Lee C. Bollinger, The Tolerant Society 76 (1986). For a critical analysis of this

model, see id. at 76-103.
123

See Baker, 78 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 941-43 (cited in note 54); David Goldberger, Judi-

cial Scrutiny in Public Forum Cases: Misplaced Trust in the Judgment of Public Officials,
32 Buff. L. Rev. 175, 206-07 (1983); Redish, 34 Stan. L. Rev. at 134 (cited in note 1).
124 Goldberger, 32 Buff. L. Rev. at 207 (cited in note 123).
125 Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at 315 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See also David A. Strauss, Why be Tolerant?, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1485, 1489-90 (1986), reviewing Bollinger, The Tolerant Society (cited in note 122).
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tent-neutral restrictions.
Second, the concerns noted about content-neutral restrictions
run more to the legislative and administrative processes than to
the process of judicial review. Because challenges to content-neutral restrictions center on the concern that the law may unduly restrict the flow of speech into the "marketplace of ideas," the focus
of the inquiry is on the interests of the entire"community, not just
the interests of the particular plaintiff bringing the suit. Accordingly, the need to adopt rules that protect judges and jurors from
their own biases or miscalculations is less in the context of content-neutral review than in content-based review. So long as courts
do not unduly defer to legislative and administrative judgments,
they should be in a reasonably good position independently to protect first amendment rights. Bias is most likely to exist in the judicial process when content-neutral laws have clear content-differential effects on their face. 126 Such laws are relatively rare, however.
Moreover, even in such cases, the harm that can flow from judicial
miscalculation is limited. Content-neutral restrictions usually limit
the availability of only particular means of expression. They are
thus unlikely substantially to block the communication of particu7
lar messages.12
Third, the extension of strict scrutiny to all content-neutral
restrictions would invalidate many laws that limit speech in a content-neutral manner. 2 8 The consequential disruption, if individuals were free to speak or assemble at any time and place and in any
manner they chose, would be intolerable. Many content-neutral
laws that could not satisfy the "fortress" model's strict scrutiny are
essential to the general well-being of society. Laws, for example,
prohibiting two groups from marching on Main Street at the same
time, or forbidding the use of loudspeakers in residential neighborhoods at night, or prohibiting the scattering of leaflets over an entire city from helicopters, are perfectly sensible enactments despite
the fact that they restrict free expression. It is simply not sensible
to construe the first amendment in such a way as to turn people's
homes and society's police stations, courthouses, and schools into
completely open "forums in which anyone may freely engage in
first amendment expression.
As the Court observed almost fifty

127

See Stone, Content Regulation, 25 Wm & Mary L. Rev. at 226 (cited in note 1).
See id.

2'

See Harold L. Quadres, Content-Neutral Public Forum Regulations: The Rise of the

:2

Aesthetic State Interest, The Fall of Judicial Scrutiny, 37 Hastings L. J. 429, 453 (1986).
"' Baker, 78 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 939 (cited in note 54).
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years ago, civil liberties "imply the existence of an organized society maintaining public order without which liberty itself would be
lost in the excesses of unrestrained abuses."' 130 The extension of
strict scrutiny to all content-neutral restrictions would threaten society with chaos.
Content-based laws, on the other hand, do not serve such purposes, so the Court's near-absolute prohibition on any contentbased restriction of high-value speech does not impose nearly the
same costs as would wholesale invalidation of content-neutral laws.
Moreover, unlike most content-neutral restrictions, the objectives
of most content-based restrictions can be attained by other means.
In some situations, content-based laws can be converted into content-neutral laws. For example, a law prohibiting the exhibition of
any movie displaying nudity in any drive-in theatre visible from a
public street can be converted into a law prohibiting the exhibition
of any movie in any drive-in theatre visible from a public street.
Such a conversion protects the legitimate governmental interest in
traffic safety without posing the special dangers of content-based
restrictions. 13 1 It also would tend to spread the costs of preserving
traffic safety among many speakers, rather than allowing government to concentrate the costs on one small group. The more speakers in a community are affected, the more government would be
forced to ensure its purposes truly were substantial before it enacted the restriction. In other situations, the objectives of contentbased restrictions can be attained by shifting attention from the
speech to the harm caused by the speech. For example, instead of
prohibiting criticism of a war in order to prevent draft evasion, the
government can raise the penalty for evasion.
A fourth reason why the "fortress" methodology of contentbased review should not be carried over to content-neutral analysis
is that it comes at the cost of encouraging strategic behavior by
people who want to violate laws reasonably necessary to public order. To the extent that litigants are able to characterize their actions as protected speech, virtually all laws could be subject to first
amendment challenge. For example, laws banning graffiti on publicly and privately owned buildings and vehicles, or speed limit
laws, could be challenged on first amendment grounds: graffiti is
clearly a form of expressive behavior and even speeding can be
seen as a form of expression-a symbolic expression of protest
against, say, the 55 m.p.h. speed limit. The need to balance the
"I Cox
131

v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. at 574.
See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 214 (1975).
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protection of first amendment rights against the need to limit strategic abuses of those rights has figured prominently in free exercise
cases.13 2 The problem is no less pressing in the context of free
speech claims.
Finally, extending the "fortress" model's strict scrutiny to all
content-neutral restrictions might lead to the dilution of strict
scrutiny. Because society would not tolerate the invalidation of virtually all content-neutral restrictions, the extension of strict scrutiny to all content-neutral restrictions would ultimately weaken the
"fortress" and undermine the doctrinal and jurisprudential safeguards against the dangers of content-based restrictions.3 3 The net
effect might well be to erode rather than to bolster the protection
of free expression.
The Court's approach to content-neutral review thus seems a
sensible response to the concern that content-neutral restrictions
can diminish the opportunities for free expression. Unlike a consistently deferential approach, which would uphold every contentneutral restriction that rationally furthers a legitimate governmental interest, the Court's approach critically examines restrictions
that seriously threaten significant first amendment rights. And unlike a rigid strict scrutiny approach, which would invalidate almost
all content-neutral restrictions, the Court's analysis does not sacrifice legitimate governmental interests when significant first amendment rights are not at issue.
C. An Evaluation of the Court's Results
As we saw in the discussion of the fortress model of contentbased review, an essential function of standards of review is to allocate the risk of uncertainty. The pivotal inquiry in content-neutral analysis is the extent to which particular restrictions actually
diminish the opportunities for free expression. As the illustrative
cases suggest, this is not an easy question. Such judgments are
largely speculative. They lend themselves more to hunches and
'32 For example, in United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982), the Supreme Court limited the scope of the mandatory free exercise exemption from facially neutral laws set out in
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). Lee
held that the broad public interest in maintaining the "fiscal vitality of the social security
system," 455 U.S. at 260, was so important that allowing religiously motivated exemptions-even for sincerely held religious beliefs such as the Amish beliefs forbidding payment
of Social Security tax-offered no basis for resisting the tax. Id. at 261.
133 Those who propose unified standards for both content-based and content-neutral
restrictions inevitably dilute the existing standards of content-based review. For an illustration of this phenomenon, see Redish, 34 Stan. L. Rev. at 142-50 (cited in note 1).
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guesswork than to empirical proof. Who should bear the risk of
uncertainty-the speaker or the government? When uncertainty
exists, should the speaker have to shift to alternative means of expression or should the government have to shift to alternative
means of achieving its objectives?
In its decisions involving content-neutral restrictions that have
significant or severe effects on the opportunities for free expression, the Court has been reasonably protective of speech. Decisions
such as Buckley, Button, Brown, and Jaycees demonstrate a
thoughtful concern for the system of free expression and a healthy
skepticism about the government's need to restrict free speech to
achieve its ends.
In its decisions involving content-neutral restrictions that have
only modest effects on the opportunities for free expression, however, the Court too often has exhibited insensitivity to the importance of nontraditional means of expression, the uncertainty of its
own judgments, and the dangers of undue deference to legislative
and administrative officials. As noted above, powerful incentives
may induce legislative and administrative officials to deflate speech
interests and inflate governmental interests when they fashion content-neutral restrictions. The Court's highly deferential standard
of review does not adequately take account of these distortions.
Although the Court has generally applied low-level scrutiny in the
right cases, its low-level scrutiny is simply too low.
Even when a particular content-neutral restriction has only a
modest effect on the total quantity of public debate because the
speaker can shift to alternative means of expression, some weight
should be given to the speaker's choice of means, since the speaker
can be presumed to have chosen the most effective means available.134 In cases like Adderley, O'Brien, and Community for Crea'=' This rationale is distinct from the concern that the speaker's choice should be
respected because, even if alternative means are equally effective, the speaker has an independently valued "self-fulfillment" interest in using the particular means of expression he
prefers. See Baker, 78 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 945-49, 972-77 (cited in note 54); Powe, 1982 S. Ct.
Rev. at 267 (cited in note 60); Emerson, 68 Cal. L. Rev. at 474 (cited in note 1).
In analyzing content-neutral restrictions, the Court seems to have given little weight to
the "self-fulfillment" interest in choosing a particular means of expression. This seems
sound. The central concern of the self-fulfillment rationale for the protection of free speech
is that each person have the opportunity to express his autonomously formulated thoughts
and opinions, not that each person have the opportunity to express those views by whatever
means he chooses. Stone, Compelled Exemptions, 28 Win. & Mary L. Rev. (forthcoming
1986) (cited in note 103); Farber and Nowak, 70 Va. L. Rev. at 1237 (cited in note 54);
Tribe, American Constitutional Law at 684 (cited in note 46). However, the self-fulfillment
concern should be given some weight, and it may be sufficient in itself to require the government to offer at least some reasonable explanation for its refusal to accommodate the
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tive Non-Violence, for example, the government's decision to prevent speakers from using their chosen means of expression may not
have significantly diminished the total quantity of public debate,
but there can be no doubt that the challenged restrictions denied
speakers access to especially effective and dramatic means of communication. A modest effect, in other words, is not no effect. And
even if a modest effect is insufficient to elevate the standard of
review to intermediate scrutiny, or to justify a constitutionally
compelled exemption, it is sufficient to require the government to
offer some meaningful explanation for its refusal to accommodate
free speech.
Thus, in cases like Adderley, Grayned, Heffron, O'Brien, and
Community for Creative Non-Violence, the Court should be more
skeptical of the claimed governmental interests and more sensitive
to the interests of free speech. Although each of these issues
viewed in isolation may seem trivial,3 5 the issues take on a different appearance when one steps back and examines the cumulative
effect. From that perspective, it is difficult to escape the conclusion
that the Court's current approach will gradually produce a choking
off of all but the most traditional means of expression. A rational
basis standard is too deferential. It does not fairly accommodate
the competing interests. In such cases, the Court should invalidate
even a modest content-neutral restriction unless the government
can demonstrate that the challenged restriction serves a significant
governmental interest that could not be substantially achieved by
alternative means that reasonably accommodate free expression. 13 6
The application of this standard is illustrated in the dissenting
opinions in Community for Creative Non-Violence, Heffron, and
37
Adderley.1
In deciding whether and to what extent particular contentneutral restrictions diminish the opportunities for free expression,
the Court should err on the side of free speech. It should allocate
the risk of uncertainty to the government, not to speakers. The
speaker's choice of means.
135 The Court's abdication in these cases is no doubt due in part to its desire to conserve judicial resources and to avoid the endless quibbling and fine balancing that might be
necessary if the Court were to open the door to litigation over what it appears to regard as
trivial issues. These are legitimate concerns.
136 Note that this standard is the one embodied in formulations 4 and 5, not as those
formulations have been applied in the past, but as they are articulated. See text accompanying notes 9-10 above.
See Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at 301-16 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Heffron, 452 U.S. at 656-63 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); Adderley, 385 U.S. at 48-56 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
137
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opposite approach-requiring speakers to prove that they could
not reach their audience by alternative means before the Court will
"require the state to justify its speech limitations"13 -- creates the
risk that an ever-narrowing circle of expression will remain free as
the anti-speech allocation gradually takes its toll.13 9
This does not mean that the Court should extend the fortress
model to the realm of content-neutral restrictions or test all content-neutral restrictions with strict scrutiny. It does mean, however, that in evaluating content-neutral restrictions, the Court
must be sensitive to the dangers of ad hoc evaluation and the risk
of gradual erosion of the opportunities for effective free expression.
To help focus its analysis and to produce a more stable and
predictable jurisprudence, the Court should move away from ad
hoc inquiry and towards a more structured approach. As suggested
above, the Court has in deed, if not in word, already embraced a
relatively structured analysis. In practice, the Court ordinarily
tests restrictions that have a severe effect on free expression with
strict scrutiny; it ordinarily tests restrictions that have a significant
effect with intermediate scrutiny; and it ordinarily tests restrictions that have a modest effect with deferential scrutiny. It is time
for the Court to make explicit what is already implicit in its
decisions.

IV.

SECONDARY CONCERNS

The Court's content-neutral balancing is designed to deal primarily with the concern that, by limiting the opportunities for free
expression, content-neutral restrictions can diminish the total
quantity of public debate. However, this is not the only concern
that shapes the Court's analysis of content-neutral restrictions. In
at least some cases additional concerns may significantly raise or
lower the standard of review. 140 This part examines six of these
concerns: disparate impact, public property, tradition, discrimination against speech, incidental effect, and communicative
4
impact.1 '
Quadres, 37 Hastings L. J. at 482 (cited in note 128).
See Emerson, 68 Cal. L. Rev. at 474 (cited in note 1).
140 For example, compare Cloud Books, 106 S. Ct. 3172; Wayte, 470 U.S. 598; Taxpayers for Vincent, 468 U.S. 789; Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978); and
Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665 (all applying deferential review despite restriction's significant effect on speech) with Grace, 461 U.S. 171; and Grayned, 408 U.S. 104 (both applying intermediate review despite restriction's modest effects on speech).
M Two additional concerns merit mention. First, the Court in the 1960s frequently
invoked a distinction between "speech" and "conduct" in analyzing content-neutral restric18
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A. Disparate Impact
Even content-neutral laws can have content-differential effects.1" 2 That is, even a law that on its face applies even-handedly
to all speakers may have a greater impact on some speakers than
on others. For example, a law banning all billboards will have a
disparate impact on those speakers who tend disproportionately to
rely upon billboards to communicate their messages.
The existence of disparate impacts poses several concerns.
First, a law that has a disparate impact is more likely to distort
public debate than is a law that has a perfectly equal impact on all
speakers. Second, a law that has a disparate impact is more likely
to have been motivated by impermissible purposes than is a law
that has a perfectly equal impact. And third, it is more difficult to
measure the restrictive effects of a law that has a different impact
on different speakers than a law that has a perfectly equal impact.
Faced with these concerns, the Court has three options, each
of which has distinct disadvantages. First, the Court may disregard
tions. See, e.g., Cox, 379 U.S. at 555 (distinguishing "patrolling, marching, and picketing"
from "pure" speech). The Court has sensibly abandoned this distinction in more recent decisions. See, e.g., Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308, 313-14
(1968). For commentary on the distinction, see Tribe, American Constitutional Law at 598601 (cited in note 46); Ely, 88 Harv. L. Rev. at 1493-96 (cited in note 22); Harry Kalven, Jr.,
The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 S. Ct. Rev. 1, 23.
Second, the Court has frequently indicated that a content-neutral law is invalid if it
was motivated by a desire to suppress a particular point of view. See, e.g., Cornelius, 105
S.Ct. at 3454-55; Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608; Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 804; Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 580. But see O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 383-85 (court should not strike down
otherwise constitutional statute on basis of alleged illicit legislative motive). For discussion
of inquiries into improper motivation, see, e.g., Tribe, American Constitutional Law at 59198 (cited in note 46); Zacharias, 72 Cornell L. Rev. (cited in note 117); J. Morris Clark,
Legislative Motivation and Fundamental Rights in Constitutional Law, 15 San Diego L.
Rev. 953 (1978); Larry G. Simon, Racially Prejudiced Governmental Actions: A Motivation
Theory of the Constitutional Ban Against Racial Discrimination, 15 San Diego L. Rev. 1041
(1978); Theodore Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 36 (1977); Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An
Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 S. Ct. Rev. 95; John
Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 Yale L. J.
1205 (1970). For the view that many of the doctrines formulated by the Court are best
understood as prophylactic devices designed to screen out improper motivation, see David
S. Bogen, Balancing Freedom of Speech, 38 Md. L. Rev. 387 (1979); David S. Bogen, The
Supreme Court's Interpretation of the Guarantee of Freedom of Speech, 35 Md. L. Rev. 555
(1976).
142 See, e.g., Stone, Content Regulation, 25 Win. & Mary L. Rev. at 218 (cited in note
1); Stone, Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 102-03 (cited in note 1); Redish,
34 Stan. L. Rev. at 131 (cited in note 1); Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle
in the First Amendment, 43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 20, 36 (1975). See also Taxpayers for Vincent,
466 U.S. at 823 n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468
U.S. at 312-16 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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the disparate impact and scrutinize the law as if the disparate impact did not exist. However, this would ignore the significant concerns raised by disparate impact.
Second, the Court may elevate the standard of review for the
law as a whole. Under this approach, the Court will require the
government to bear a greater burden of justification whenever a
law has a disparate impact. However, almost all content-neutral
restrictions have a disparate impact in some degree, and in most
instances, the disparate impact will be quite minor. Accordingly,
elevation of the standard of review for every law that has a disparate impact would prevent the government from achieving its legitimate interests in many instances in which the disparate impact
concerns are insubstantial. The costs of elevating the standard of
review, in other words, may substantially outweigh the benefits.
Third, the Court may apply an elevated standard of review
only for those speakers who are disproportionately affected. It may
then sustain the law in most of its applications but create a constitutionally compelled exemption for those speakers who are disproportionately affected. At first blush, this third option may seem a
perfect middle ground, respecting both the free speech interests of
the group and the legitimate societal interests behind the restriction. But it has two significant disadvantages.
The first disadvantage of constitutionally compelled exemptions is that they may create preferences that threaten first
amendment values to an even greater extent than the problems
they are designed to solve. Suppose, for example, that anti-abortion groups rely especially heavily on billboards to communicate
their message. A constitutionally compelled exemption for antiabortion groups from an otherwise constitutional prohibition of
billboards would convert a content-neutral law into one based on
viewpoint. In so doing, it would invert the usual presumptions of
free speech jurisprudence. In recognizing an exemption for a particular group, government would be manipulating the marketplace
of ideas. Although the differential governmental treatment in this
instance would be designed to counteract the differential effect of
the restriction, the danger is similar: government judging how
much speech each group in society should get.
The second problem with constitutionally compelled exemptions is that they may necessitate inquiries that threaten first
amendment values even more than the problems such exemptions
are designed to solve. In the billboard case, for example, the implementation of a constitutionally compelled exemption would require
administrative officials to determine whether each speaker seeking
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to use a billboard was in fact taking an "anti-abortion" stance. The
unseemliness of such inquiries is obvious.
In its analysis of the disparate impact of content-neutral re143
strictions, the Court has employed all three of these options.
The choice of option has corresponded to the extent to which the
challenged law restricts the opportunities for free expression of a
particular group or viewpoint. Laws that have only a modest effect
on free expression trigger no special treatment; laws that have a
significant effect trigger heightened scrutiny of the law as a whole;
and laws that have a severe effect on a particular group trigger
creation of an exemption for that group.
As we saw earlier,' 4 4 many modest content-neutral restrictions
have a disparate impact upon particular speakers. However, the
Court routinely disregards disparate impact in considering the constitutionality of such restrictions. In Greer,14 5 for example, the
Court upheld a regulation prohibiting all political speeches and
demonstrations on a military base, without considering the fact
that such a regulation is likely to impair the first amendment interests of some speakers far more than the interests of others: the
regulation prevents exposure to "those minor candidates whose
campaigns are neither prominent enough nor sufficiently well-financed to attract media coverage" and are thus compelled to
"make do with the more old fashioned face-to-face style of
campaigning.' 1 46 Similarly, in Heffron,14 7 the Court upheld a restriction on peripatetic distribution of written material at a state
fair, without considering the fact that the rule was substantially
more likely to impair the first amendment interests of those speakers who traditionally use this means of communication. And in
O'Brien,148 the Court upheld a federal statute prohibiting any person from knowingly destroying a draft card, as applied to an individual who publicly burned his draft card as a symbolic expression
of protest against the draft, without considering the fact that the
statute was substantially more likely to impair the speech of those
who opposed government policy than of those who supported it.
Who, after all, would destroy a draft card as an expression of support of government policy?

"' For analysis of these three options in the free exercise context, see Stone, Constitutionally Compelled Exemptions, 28 Win. & Mary L. Rev. (cited in note 103).
14 See text accompanying notes 46-47 above.
245 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
146 Spock v. David, 469 F.2d 1047, 1056 (3d Cir. 1972).
147 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
148 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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In these and similar cases, 149 the actual restrictive effect of the
challenged law is clearly disparate, but it is not severe, for even the
disproportionately disadvantaged speakers may readily shift to alternative means of expression. In such circumstances, the disparate
impact does not significantly restrict free expression, nor does it
appreciably distort public debate. And it is unlikely to be the result of improper motivation, because legislative and administrative
officials are much more likely to adopt a content-neutral law in
order to disadvantage speech they dislike when the law significantly disadvantages the disfavored speech than when it has only a
modest effect. The concerns generated by disparate impact in such
cases are thus not sufficiently substantial to warrant either applying a higher degree of scrutiny or creating a constitutionally compelled exemption. In these cases, the Court is justified in disregarding the disparate impact and applying a deferential standard
of review. 150
Content-neutral laws that have a significant effect on free expression may also have a disparate impact. In this context, however, the Court sometimes employs the second option, elevating
the standard of review for the restriction as a whole. For example,
in Anderson v. Celebrezze, which invalidated a filing deadline for
ballot access, the Court observed that a restriction on political participation "that falls unequally on new or small political parties or
on independent candidates" must be tested by a heightened standard of review. 151 Similarly, in Martin v. City of Struthers, which
invalidated an ordinance prohibiting door-to-door leafletting, the
Court emphasized that this means of expression "isessential to the
poorly financed causes of little people. 1

52

And in the public forum

context, the Court, recognizing that laws substantially restricting
leafletting or similar means of expression may have a disproportionate impact upon those who, for reasons of finances or ideology,
do not have ready access to more conventional means of communication, has long considered this a factor that may justify a heightened standard of review.153 In each of these contexts, the Court
149

See, e.g., Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288; Grace, 461 U.S. 171;

Grayned, 408 U.S. 104; Adderley, 385 U.S. 39.
1O This is subject, of course, to my earlier criticism of the unduly timid nature of the
Court's deferential standard of review. See text accompanying notes 134-39 above.
151460 U.S. at 793.
152319 U.S. at 146.
153See Eric Neisser, Charging for Free Speech: User Fees and Insurance in the Marketplace of Ideas, 74 Georgetown L. J. 257, 297 (1985); Baker, 78 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 944-45
(cited in note 54); Stone and Marshall, 1983 S. Ct. Rev. at 596 (cited in note 1); Karst, 43 U.
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elevates the level of scrutiny for the restriction as a whole, either
by shifting from one level or review to another or by subtly intensifying the application of the same standard. If the law cannot withstand the heightened scrutiny, it is invalidated in its entirety. If it
satisfies the higher standard, it is upheld despite the disparate
impact.
Two final observations are in order with respect to laws that
have a significant effect on free expression. First, although the
above illustrations show that the Court sometimes employs a
higher standard in reviewing these sorts of restrictions, in other
cases the Court disregards the disparate impact and does not elevate the standard of review.15 4 There is no clear pattern to the
cases. Second, although the Court often employs the second option
in these cases, it never employs the third. That is, the Court does
not create constitutionally compelled exemptions to laws that have
only a significant, not a severe, effect on free expression. In this
context, the dangers of creating a constitutionally compelled exemption are greater than the costs of either invalidating the law as
a whole or disregarding the disparate impact entirely.
The Court employs the third option-creation of a constitutionally compelled exemption-only when a content-neutral law
has a significantly disparate effect on some speakers and the actual
restrictive effect on those speakers is severe. In Brown v. Socialist
Workers '74 Campaign Committee, for example, the Court created
a constitutionally compelled exemption for the Socialist Workers
Party from state campaign contributor disclosure requirements.
The Court explained that in light of the history of harassment of
Party members, disclosure could cripple the organization's ability
to operate effectively and could deter membership and contributions to such an extent that "'the movement cannot survive.' ,15
The consequence would be a "'reduction in the free circulation of
ideas both within and without the political arena.' ,,156 In such circumstances, the disparate impact is so severe, and the risk of distorting public debate is so great, that a constitutionally compelled

Chi. L. Rev. at 36 (cited in note 142); Kalven, 1965 S. Ct. Rev. at 30 (cited in note 141). See
also Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 813 n.30; Metromedia, Inc., 453 U.S. 490 at 550, 552
(Stevens, J., dissenting), 563 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 102 (Black, J.,
dissenting).
154 See, e.g., Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608-10; Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 813 n.30;
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 31-33; Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 88-89.
115 Brown, 459 U.S. at 93, quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 71.
155 459 U.S. at 93, quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 71. See also Anderson, 460 U.S. at 793.
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exemption is warranted. For the reasons given above, 157 however,
granting an exemption from an otherwise valid law is an extraordidevice, and it is only in the rare case that the Court employs
nary
158
it.
B.

Public Property

To what extent, if any, should the fact that speech takes place
on public property shift the standard of review? This is a crucial
question, for a great many content-neutral restrictions are aimed
at speech 9on public property. There are at least five distinct
15
positions:
1. The government has plenary power to control public
property. Under this view, public ownership trumps the central
concern of content-neutral analysis. That is, regardless of the effect
on public debate of content-neutral restrictions of speech on public
property, the first amendment does not guarantee speakers the
right to commandeer such property.
This position finds support in two sources. First, there is an
analogy to private property. The Court has generally held that an
owner of private property may forbid others to use his property for
speech purposes. Indeed, the Court has indicated that, in most circumstances, "an uninvited guest may [not] exercise general rights
of free speech on property privately owned," for it "would be an
unwarranted infringement of property rights to require them to
yield to the exercise of First Amendment rights."'' 0 This approach
might be extended to hold that the first amendment respects the
property rights of the government to essentially the same extent
that it respects the property rights of any other owner of property.
Second, the position finds support in the principle that the government is not constitutionally obligated to subsidize the exercise of
constitutional rights. 61 The government's failure to provide funds
"I See
158

notes 114-33 and accompanying text above.

See Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S.

449 (1958). For a more thorough discussion of constitutionally compelled exemptions, see
Stone and Marshall, 1983 S. Ct. Rev. 583 (cited in note 1).
159 This discussion deals only with content-neutral restrictions. Content-based restrictions involving public property also generate a distinct set of problems. See generally Stone
et al., Constitutional Law at 1244-47 (cited in note 4); Farber and Nowak, 70 Va.L. Rev. at
1219 (cited in note 54).
160 Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 568, 567 (1972). See also Martin, 319 U.S. at
148 (conceding that a city constitutionally could "punish those who call at a home in defiance of the previously expressed will of the occupant").
161See, e.g., Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 54446 (1983) (lobbying); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316-17 (1980) (abortion funding);
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for those who want to operate newspapers, for example, does not
violate the first amendment. Similarly, the government's failure to
make public property available to those who want to speak on public property does not abridge the freedom of speech."' 2
2. Public ownership dilutes the standardof review. This position is similar to the first, but concedes that there are constitutionally significant differences between government and private
ownership and between requiring the government directly to subsidize constitutional rights and requiring the government to bear the
16 3
It
incidental costs associated with the exercise of such rights.
thus adopts a less severe version of the first position. Under this
view, a content-neutral restriction that severely restricts the opportunities for free expression by denying access to public property
might be tested by intermediate rather than strict scrutiny; a restriction that significantly restricts free expression might be tested
by deferential rather than intermediate scrutiny; and a restriction
that only modestly restricts free expression might not be scrutinized at all.
3. Public ownership does not alter the standard of review.
Under this view, the government's status as property owner is irrelevant to the standard of review. Thus, as in cases that do not
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1977) (abortion funding).
,6' This is the approach taken by Justice Holmes in his 1895 opinion for the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510 (1895), which
upheld an ordinance restricting the use of the Boston Common for "any public address."
Holmes explained that for "the Legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public
speaking in a highway or public park is no more an infringement of the rights of a member
of the public than for the owner of a private house to forbid it in his house." Id. at 511. On
appeal, the United States Supreme Court unanimously adopted Holmes's position, observing that the federal Constitution "does not have the effect of creating a particular and personal right in the citizen to use public property in defiance of the constitution and laws of
the State." Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 47-48 (1897). Thus, the Court in Davis
embraced position 1, holding that the government may prohibit the exercise of first amendment rights on public property simply by asserting the prerogatives traditionally associated
with the private ownership of land.
'63 Indeed, the very notion of constitutional rights implies a "subsidy" in the broad
sense that government bears the costs incident to exercise of that right. For example, when
the government is prevented from searching an individual without probable cause, it is in
effect "subsidizing" his right because it must continue its investigation by other, less efficient, means. Similarly, when the government is prevented from collecting damages from a
speaker whose constitutionally protected speech "causes" a crowd to burn a government
building it is in effect "subsidizing" the freedom of speech. Of course, in these examples the
government is not giving government property directly to the speaker. The mere fact that
the protection of a particular constitutional right requires the government to "subsidize"
the cost of the right in this broad sense is not in itself dispositive. For a useful discussion,
see Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive
State, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1293 (1984).
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involve public property, the constitutional inquiry in cases that involve public property focuses entirely on the central concern of
content-neutral balancing-whether the governmental interests are
sufficiently weighty to offset the effects on free speech. Of course,
the very fact of public ownership may enable the government to
assert some interests, such as the avoidance of disruption of the
property, that are tied directly to the government's status as
owner. But, under this view, public ownership does not alter the
164
standard of review itself.
4. Public ownership elevates the standard of review. This
position finds support in several considerations: access to public
property is often essential for large gatherings; it enables speakers
to challenge governmental action at its source; it permits speakers
to reach audiences that might otherwise be difficult to reach; it enables less affluent speakers to utilize means of expression that are
more affordable than most "private" means of expression, such as
newspapers, television, and radio; and it prevents controversial or
dissident speakers from being shut out of public debate by the refusal of private owners to sell or lease them their facilities.16 5 In
light of these considerations, this position maintains that governmental restrictions of speech on public property pose special dangers that warrant heightened scrutiny. Thus, under this view a restriction of speech on public property that has a modest effect on
free expression might be tested by intermediate rather than deferential scrutiny; a restriction that has a significant effect might be
tested by strict rather than intermediate scrutiny; and a restriction
that has a severe effect might be per se unconstitutional.
5. Public ownership affects the standard of review differently for different types of public property. Under this approach,
public ownership might raise, lower, or have no effect upon the
standard of review for content-neutral restrictions, depending
upon such factors as tradition, the importance of the property for
effective free speech, and the general suitability of the property for
free expression.
Existing doctrine divides public property into three categories.1 66 Public places traditionally associated with expressive activi18

For support of this position, see Farber and Nowak, 70 Va. L. Rev. at 1234-35 (cited

in note 54).
16' See Neisser, 74 Georgetown L. J. at 297 (cited in note 153); Cass, 65 Va. L. Rev. at
1288 (cited in note 102). See also Cornelius, 105 S. Ct. at 3456 (Blackmun, J., dissenting);
Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 819-20 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Martin, 319 U.S. at
145-46.
"' For accounts of the development of public forum doctrine, see Cass, 65 Va. L. Rev.
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ties, such as streets, sidewalks, and parks, are deemed "quintessential" public forums. As the Court noted in dictum in Hague v.
CIO,167 such places have been dedicated "time out of mind" to free
expression. In such forums, the government may not shut off all
communicative activity; it may not substantially or completely
prohibit a particular means of expression unless the prohibition is
"narrowly drawn to accomplish a compelling governmental interest";168 and it may not enforce a time, place, or manner restriction
unless the restriction is "narrowly tailored to serve a significant
government interest, and leave[s] open ample alternative channels
' 69
of communication.'
Public places that have not been dedicated "time out of mind"
to free expression, but have been opened voluntarily by the government for use by the public as places for expressive activity, are
deemed "designated" public forums. The government is not required to retain the open character of such forums, but "as long as
it does so it is bound by the same standards as apply in a tradi70
tional public forum.'
Public places that are not by tradition or designation public
forums are deemed "nonpublic" forums. In nonpublic forums, the
government's rights as a property owner generally are paramount.
As the Court declared in Adderley v. Florida,the government, "no
less than a private owner of property," may preserve its property
"for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated.' M7 The government

1287 (cited in note 102); Stone, Fora Americana, 1974 S. Ct. Rev. 233 (cited in note 93);
Kalven, 1965 S. Ct. Rev. 1 (cited in note 141).
167307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939) ("Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they

have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have
been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.").
160 Grace, 461 U.S. at 177.

96Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983). See also Grace, 461 U.S. at 177.
Mo Perry Education Association, 460 U.S. at 46. See also Cornelius, 105 S.Ct. at 3448.
171 385 U.S. at 47. The Court has reaffirmed this approach in, e.g., Greer, 424 U.S. at

836; Perry Education Association, 460 U.S. at 46; Cornelius, 105 S.Ct. at 3448.
Several years after Adderley, the Court in Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972),

appeared in dictum to abandon the distinction between traditional public forums and traditionally closed public property. The Court said the "crucial question" in every case is
"whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a
particular place at a particular time." 408 U.S. at 116. In celebration of Grayned, I wrote at

the time that "[n]o longer does the right to effective freedom of expression turn on the
common law property rights of the state. . . [or] whether the particular place at issue has
historically been dedicated to the exercise of First Amendment rights." Stone, Fora Ameri-

cana, 1974 S. Ct. Rev. at 251-52 (cited in note 93). But the celebration was premature.
Although the Court since Grayned has tempered the Adderley approach that treats the
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may thus restrict expressive activity in nonpublic forums as long as
its restrictions are "reasonable."' 1 2 The Court has applied the "reasonableness" standard in this context in a highly deferential manner: it will uphold a content-neutral exclusion of speech from a
nonpublic forum as long as the exclusion rationally furthers a legitimate governmental interest. Applying this standard, the Court
has
upheld every content-neutral restriction of speech in a nonpublic
17 3
forum that it has considered.
Existing public forum doctrine prompts several observations.
First, although several commentators have suggested to the contrary, 7 4 it seems clear to me that the Court does indeed apply different standards of review to public forums and nonpublic forums.
Contrast, for example, United States v. Grace, 75 which invalidated a federal statute prohibiting any display of flags, banners, or
similar devices on the public sidewalk surrounding the Supreme
Court, with Greer v. Spock,'7 6 which upheld a military regulation
prohibiting any political speeches, demonstrations, or similar activities in the public areas of a military base. The actual effects of the
challenged restrictions on the opportunities for free expression
seem similar in degree. If there is a difference, it is that the military regulation seems likely to restrict more speech. The Court
held in Greer, however, that a military base is a nonpublic forum.
It therefore applied a highly deferential standard of review and upheld the regulation because it served its legitimate interest in insulating the military from both the reality and the appearance of political involvement. By contrast, the Court in Grace held that the

government in many cases as simply another property owner, the Court has continued to
differentiate sharply between public and nonpublic forums.
172 Cornelius, 105 S.Ct. at 3448. See Perry Education Association, 460 U.S. at 46; Council of Greenburgh Civic Associations, 453 U.S. at 131 n.7. In addition, such restrictions must
not be "an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's
view." Cornelius, 105 S.Ct. at 3448.
1M3 See, e.g., Albertini, 472 U.S. 675 (military base); Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S.
789 (public utility poles); Council of Greenburgh Civic Associations, 453 U.S. 114 (letter
boxes); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 548-52 (1979) (prison); Adderley, 385 U.S. 39 (jail
grounds); Heffron, 452 U.S. 640 (state fair grounds); Greer, 424 U.S. 828 (military base). In
upholding a number of subject matter or speaker-based exclusions from nonpublic forums,
the Court has indicated that it would also uphold content-neutral exclusions from such forums. See, e.g., Cornelius, 473 U.S. 788, 105 S.Ct. 3439 (charitable contribution campaign
among federal employees); Perry Education Association, 460 U.S. 37 (interschool mail system); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (public transit vehicles).
174 See Nimmer on Freedom of Speech § 4.09(D) (cited in note 4); Farber and Nowak,
70 Va.L. Rev. at 1239 (cited in note 54).
:75 461 U.S. 171 (1983).
176 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
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sidewalk surrounding the Supreme Court building is a traditional
public forum. The Court therefore applied a more demanding standard of review and invalidated the regulation despite the government's argument that the regulation served its legitimate interest
in insulating the Court from both the reality and the appearance of
outside influence.
Similarly, contrast Schneider v. State,177 which invalidated an
ordinance prohibiting the distribution of leaflets on public streets,
parks, and sidewalks, with Members of the City Council of Los
Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent,17 8 which upheld an ordinance
prohibiting the posting of signs, including political campaign signs,
on public utility poles. Again, the actual effects of the challenged
restrictions seem similar. The Court held in Vincent, however, that
public utility poles are nonpublic forums. It therefore applied a
deferential standard of review and upheld the ordinance because it
served the city's legitimate interest in preventing visual blight. By
contrast, the Court in Schneider held that streets, parks, and sidewalks are public forums. It therefore applied a more demanding
standard of review and invalidated the ordinance despite the city's
argument that the ordinance served the city's legitimate interest in
preventing litter. Thus, although there are grey areas, 79 it seems
clear that the Court does in fact apply different standards of review to public forums and nonpublic forums. In terms of the five
positions described earlier in this section, the Court has adopted
the fifth.
Second, although it is clear that the Court applies different
standards of review for public forums and nonpublic forums, it is
less clear precisely what standards it applies. That is, in comparing
the standards the Court uses to test restrictions of speech on public property with the ordinary standards of content-neutral review,
it is unclear whether the Court applies diluted standards of review
for nonpublic forums and unaltered standards for public forums,
unaltered standards for nonpublic forums and heightened standards for public forums, or diluted standards for nonpublic forums
and heightened standards for public forums. This uncertainty is
177308 U.S. 147 (1939).

466 U.S. 789 (1984).
M9 The Court has indicated, for example, that "'the analytical line between a regulation of the "time, place, and manner" in which First Amendment rights may be exercised in
a traditional public forum, and the question of whether a particular piece of personal or real
property owned or controlled by the government is in fact a "public forum" may blur at the
edges."' Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 815 n.32, quoting Council of Greenburgh Civic
Associations, 453 U.S. at 132.
178
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due to several factors-such as the Court's general lack of care in
articulating its standards, its occasional inconsistency in articulating and applying its standards within both the public forum and
nonpublic forum categories,1 80 and the fact that most modest content-neutral restrictions involve speech on public property-that
make it difficult to identify an independent baseline for comparison. In general, however, the Court seems to apply the ordinary
standards of content-neutral review to laws that restrict speech in
public forums, and diluted standards of review to laws that restrict
speech in nonpublic forums.
Third, although, as indicated earlier, it is possible to make a
case for elevating the standard of review when the government restricts speech on public property, the Court seems not to have
adopted this view even for public forums. This may be due to a
judgment that the arguments concerning the importance of public
forums for free expression are sufficient to offset the government's
property rights, but not to elevate the standard of review. Experience suggests that this is a reasonable judgment. The Court's analysis of content-neutral restrictions in public forums has produced a
set of speech-protective results without unduly sacrificing important governmental interests. Not surprisingly, then, there has been
little criticism of the Court's decisions in this regard. 18 1
Finally, unlike its public forum decisions, the Court's nonpub18 2
lic forum decisions have provoked considerable criticism. Part of
280

In the public forum context, consider, e.g., Grace, 461 U.S. 171, which applied a

demanding standard of review to a modest restriction; and Schneider, 308 U.S. 147, which
tested a law having a significant effect on free expression with a standard similar to that
used in Martin, 319 U.S. 141, which also involved a law having a significant effect on free
expression, even though Schneider, unlike Martin, involved a public forum.
In the nonpublic forum context, some decisions seem unaltered by the factor of public
property, whereas others seem to dilute the standard of review because of this element. In
Heffron, 452 U.S. 640, for example, the Court tested a modest restriction in a nonpublic
forum with the ordinary standards of content-neutral analysis. In Taxpayers for Vincent,
466 U.S. 789, however, the Court tested a law having a significant effect on free expression
with the deferential standard ordinarily reserved for modest restrictions.
281 Among the relevant decisions are Grace, 461 U.S. 171; Grayned, 408 U.S. 104; Cox
v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); and Schneider, 308 U.S. 147. The one decision
involving a public forum that has triggered significant commentary is Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288. See, e,g, Laurence H. Tribe, Constitutional Choices at 20407 (1985); Baker, 78 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 974-75 (cited in note 54) (criticizing the lower court
decision, Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
Most objection to Community for Creative Non-Violence, however, focuses more on the
Court's unwillingness to protect a particular means of expression than on its application of
public forum doctrine as such. See Baker, 78 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 974-75.
182 See, e.g., Nimmer on Freedom of Speech at § 4.09(D) (cited in note 4); Quadres, 37
Hastings L. J. 429 (cited in note 128); Farber and Nowak, 70 Va. L. Rev. 1219 (cited in note
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the difficulty stems from the highly deferential standard of review
the Court uses for modest content-neutral restrictions generally.
For the reasons offered earlier, this standard is unduly deferential
and should be abandoned. One might argue, however, that even if
this standard is inappropriate for most modest content-neutral restrictions, it is appropriate for those restrictions that involve nonpublic forums. That is, one might argue that the Court should be
especially reluctant to interfere with the government's interest in
controlling the use of nonpublic forum property.
Experience with the rigid public/nonpublic forum distinction,
however, has served only to dramatize the artificiality of the distinction. Is a public utility pole located on a public street a public
or nonpublic forum? 8 3 Is the sidewalk surrounding the Supreme
Court a public or nonpublic forum?18 Is the public area between
the sidewalk and the Supreme Court building a public or nonpublic forum?"8 5 Is the public area of a state fair a public or nonpublic
forum?"8 ' Is the public area of a military base a public or nonpublic forum?187 Unless one rigidly limits the concept of "public forum" to streets, parks, and sidewalks, narrowly defined, answers to
these questions are difficult, if not incoherent.8 8
More importantly, these are the wrong questions. Whether the
first amendment guarantees individuals a right to engage in expressive activities on public property should turn not on the common law property rights of the government and such artificial and
fictitious concepts as "first amendment easements," "adverse possession," and "public trust," but on a reasonable accommodation
of the competing speech and governmental interests. Existing doctrine, with its myopic focus on formalistic labels, serves only to distract attention from the real stakes in these disputes. As the Court
declared in Grayned v. Rockford, the "crucial question" in every
case should be "whether the manner of expression is basically in-

54); Goldberger, 32 Buff. L. Rev. 175 (cited in note 123); Baker, 78 Nw. U. L. Rev. 937 (cited
in note 54); Norman Dorsen and Joel Gora, Free Speech, Property, and the Burger Court:
Old Values, New Balances, 1982 S.Ct. Rev. 195.
183 Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (nonpublic).
194 Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (public).
188 See id. at 178-80 (nonpublic).

186Heffron, 452 U.S. 640 (nonpublic).

Greer, 424 U.S. 828 (nonpublic).
'" The public/nonpublic forum distinction has muddied analysis of subject matter and
speaker-based restrictions as well. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. 788, 105 S.Ct. 3439; Perry Education Association, 460 U.S. 37; Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Carey v. Brown, 447
U.S. 455 (1980); Lehman, 418 U.S. 298; Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92
(1972). See generally Farber and Nowak, 70 Va. L. Rev. 1219 (cited in note 54).
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compatibie with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time."'' 89
That the government owns the property is not irrelevant. To
the contrary, as already suggested, the government's rights as
property owner may be sufficient in themselves to offset the powerful arguments that have been made for elevating the standards of
review whenever public property is involved.
Similarly, that some public places have been used "time out of
mind" for speech purposes is not irrelevant. That a particular
place traditionally has been used for speech purposes suggests that
it may be an especially valuable forum, the elimination of which
may be particularly costly to free expression. Accordingly, we may
evaluate restrictions of speech in such forums with heightened
scrutiny. 19 0 Moreover, that a particular place has traditionally been
used for speech purposes suggests that the government reasonably
can tolerate speech in that forum. Accordingly, we appropriately.
may look skeptically on the government's reasons for restricting
speech in such forums. In these ways, both property rights and tradition can count in the balance without assuming undue importance. Existing doctrine, however, accords them too much weight.
A simple and sensible solution to the public property issue,
then, is to apply the same standards of content-neutral review to
restrictions of speech on public property that we apply to contentneutral restrictions generally. Public ownership should neither elevate nor dilute the appropriate standard of review. And the fact
that a place has been used "time out of mind" for speech purposes
should affect the analysis not as a dispositive criterion, but as a
relevant factor to be considered in the balance. The appropriate
standard should be that stated by the Court in dictum in Grayned:
the "critical question" in every case should be "whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity
of a particular place at a particular time."'19

Grayned, 408 U.S. at 116.
This might be implemented, for example, either by shifting in appropriate cases
from deferential to intermediate review or from intermediate to strict review, or by reviewing restrictions of speech in "traditional" forums in light of the principle of Schneider, 308
U.S. at 163, that "one is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate
places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place." On the Schneider
principle, see Tribe, American Constitutional Law at 684 (cited in note 46).
"1' Grayned, 408 U.S. at 116. See Stone, Fora Americana, 1974 S. Ct. Rev. at 251-52
(cited in note 93).
"'
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C. Tradition
As we have seen, tradition has played a central role in the formulation of public forum doctrine. Indeed, it has played too central a role. When used in a more disciplined manner, however, tradition can be useful in informing first amendment analysis-not
only in the public forum context, but in others as well.
The Court has often looked to tradition for guidance in its effort to assess the restrictive effects of content-neutral limits on
speech. In Schneider v. State,192 which invalidated a restriction of
leafletting, the Court observed that leaflets "had become historical
weapons in the defense of liberty." In Martin v. City of
Struthers,9 3 which invalidated a restriction of door-to-door solicitation, the Court emphasized that for "centuries it has been a common practice in this and other countries for persons not specifically invited to go from home to home and knock on doors or ring
doorbells to communicate ideas to the occupants." In Talley v.
California,194 which struck down a prohibition of anonymous leaflets, the Court noted that anonymous publications "have played an
important role in the progress of mankind" and that "[p]ersecuted
groups.

. .

throughout history have been able to criticize oppres-

sive practices and laws either anonymously or not at all." In Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 95 invalidating an exclusion of
the press and public from a criminal trial, the Court explained that
"the criminal trial historically has been open to the press and general public" and that since the adoption of the Constitution "the
presumption of openness has remained secure." And in Minneapolis Star v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue, 98 which invalidated a special tax on the press, the Court observed that differential taxation of the press has been historically suspect 9and
"would
7
have troubled the Framers of the First Amendment.'

As these cases recognize, the traditional use of a particular
means of expression and the traditional ban on a particular form
of prohibition are constitutionally significant both because "'the
Constitution carries the gloss of history'" and because traditional
'

308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939).
319 U.S. 141, 141 (1943).
1,, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960).
457 U.S. 596, 605 (1982).
460 U.S. 575 (1983).

"9 Id. at 583. See also Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 501 (1981)
(" 'outdoor signs have played a prominent role throughout American history, rallying support for political and social causes'") (plurality opinion), quoting Metromedia, Inc. v. San
Diego, 26 Cal.3d 848, 164 Cal. Rptr. 510, 610 P.2d 407, 430-31 (1980) (Clark, J., dissenting).
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use "'implies the favorable judgment of experience.' "198 Thus, the
Court appropriately considers tradition both in evaluating the extent to which a particular restriction actually limits the opportunities for free expression, which in turn determines the standard of
review, and in evaluating the legitimacy and strength of the interests the government asserts in defense of the restriction.
Tradition also can cut the other way. For example, in Schneider, although the Court invalidated a municipal ordinance prohibiting the traditional practice of leafletting, it made clear that the
first amendment does not "deprive a municipality of power to enact regulations against throwing literature broadcast in the
streets."' 99 At first glance, this may seem anomalous. After all,
throwing literature "broadcast in the streets" may be an even more
effective means of distribution than hand-to-hand leafletting, and
the city's interest in keeping "the streets clean and of good appearance" is no more substantial when weighed against one means of
distributing leaflets than the other. 00 The Court explained, however, that the prohibition of throwing leaflets "broadcast in the
streets" does "not abridge the constitutional liberty since such activity bears no necessary relationship to the freedom to speak,
write, print, or distribute information or opinion." '0 The Court, in
other words, found the city's interest in keeping "the streets clean
and of good appearance" insufficiently weighty to justify a ban on
leafletting, but sufficiently weighty to justify a ban on throwing
leaflets "broadcast in the streets" because tradition strongly supported the speaker's interest in using the former means of expression and strongly supported the city's interest in restricting the
latter. Thus, tradition in this context worked in favor of restricting
rather than protecting free speech.
198 Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 605, quoting Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 589 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring).

19 308 U.S. at 160-61.

100 Id. at 162. It might be argued that the distinction between hand-to-hand distribution and throwing leaflets "broadcast in the streets" is that in the former case the city can
attempt to achieve its interests by a less restrictive means: punishing litterers. Id. Punishing
litterers, however, does not eliminate the problem as well as punishing leafletters. Thus,
although there is a less restrictive means, it is also a less effective means. It does not, in
other words, fully satisfy the city's interest in keeping the "streets clean and of good appearance." Moreover, there are similar, less restrictive means available to deal with those who
throw leaflets "broadcast in the streets," such as limiting the number of leaflets or requiring
the individuals who throw leaflets "broadcast in the streets" to clean up the leaflets that
remain on the ground. In any event, this was not the argument used by the Court in Schneider to distinguish traditional leafletting from throwing leaflets "broadcast in the streets."
201 Id. at 161.
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Similarly, in Branzburg v. Hayes, 20 2 which declined to recognize a newsman's first amendment privilege not to reveal the identity of confidential sources to a grand jury, the Court took into
account the longstanding principle that "'the public . . . has a
right to every man's evidence,'" and the traditional refusal of the
common law to recognize such a privilege. As in Schneider, tradition in this context worked to restrict rather than protect free
speech.
Such "negative" uses of tradition are in principle perfectly legitimate. That the marketplace of ideas has performed satisfactorily despite the longstanding restriction of a particular means of
expression suggests that continued denial of the asserted right is
unlikely to have a significant effect on public debate. But here, as
with the "positive" use of tradition, the tradition is not dispositive.
In some instances, even a traditional restriction may be constitutionally unsound. In other instances, the legitimacy of a traditional
restriction may be undermined by changed circumstances relating
to either its altered effects on free expression or to the underlying
justifications for the restriction. In such circumstances the Court
should invalidate the restriction if, even after factoring in the lessons of history, the governmental interests do not outweigh the restrictive effects on free expression. 0 3
Whether a particular practice is supported by "tradition" is
often a subtle and complex judgment. How many exceptions are
sufficient to destroy the "tradition"? How narrowly or broadly
should the "tradition" be defined? How long must the practice exist to qualify as a "tradition"? In making its judgments about "tradition," the Court has not examined these issues with care. Rather,
it tends to assert its conclusions in a casual and untested manner.
This is inevitable to some extent, however, given the nature of the
inquiry. Moreover, the Court's judgments in this regard tend to
reflect rough but reasonable approximations of reality. Nonetheless, in making these judgments the Court should be conscious of
the very approximate nature of its assessments, and when in doubt
it should, as in other contexts, err on the side of free speech. °4
202 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972), quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950).
103 See, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (invalidating partisan dismissal of
public employees); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (invalidating the common law of libel in the context of statements about public officials).
204 See text accompanying notes 134-39 above. For an illustration of a case in which the
Court was neither careful in its judgment nor conscious to err on the side of free speech, see
Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 814, in which the Court denied "the existence of a traditional right" to post signs on public utility poles. This judgment, which was critical to the
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A final caveat is in order concerning tradition. It makes sense
to grant special protection to traditional means of expression, for
this helps to preserve at least minimum opportunities for free
speech. But undue emphasis on tradition can backfire and generate
a tendency to undervalue new and unorthodox means of expression. Such a tendency is evident, for example, in the Court's analysis of cases involving nonpublic forums. Because such property has
not been used "time out of mind" for speech purposes, the Court
does not invalidate content-neutral restrictions of speech on such
property. Undue emphasis on tradition may similarly produce a
tendency to underprotect new means of expression, such as television, radio, movies, and cable media. When loudspeakers and motion pictures first made their appearance, the Court accorded them
little if any protection, 20 5 and it still gives greater first amendment
protection to the print than to the broadcast media.206 These are
worrisome tendencies. The Court should not view new means of
expression as inherently dangerous instrumentalities unworthy of
protection equal to that accorded the more traditional means of
expression. Rather, as Justice Black observed, a basic premise of
the first amendment "is that all present instruments of communication, as well as others that inventive genius may bring into be2 07
ing," must be free of unwarranted restriction.
Similarly, unduly emphasizing tradition may have an especially severe impact on unorthodox means of expression, such as
burning draft cards to dramatize one's opposition to the draft 208 or
sleeping in a public park to dramatize the plight of the homeless. 20 9

decision, was both off-hand and questionable. See id. at 818 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that the "posting of signs is . . . a time-honored means of communicating"). Consider
also Metromedia, Inc., 453 U.S. at 501 (plurality opinion) (noting that posters "have played
a prominent role throughout American history").
:05 See Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230, 243 (1915)
(expressing doubt that motion pictures constitute "speech" within the protection of the first
amendment); Kovacs, 336 U.S. 77 (upholding restrictions of soundtrucks). Even today, while
motion pictures are considered "speech," Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495
(1952), the Court grants less protection to motion pictures than to published material in the
context of licensing. See Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961) (upholding an
ordinance requiring the submission of all motion pictures to a licensing authority before
exhibition).
2" Compare Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (print), with
Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (broadcast). See generally Lee
C. Bollinger, Jr., Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of Partial Regulation of the Mass Media, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1976).
207 Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 102 (Black, J., dissenting).
:o" O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367.

09 Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288.
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Because such unorthodox means of.expression lack the familiarity
of the traditional means, legislative and administrative officials are
especially likely to view them unsympathetically. Excessive concern with tradition on the Court's part may compound the problem
by failing to adjust for such insensitivity. The predictable consequence will be an undervaluation of unorthodox means of expression. There are real dangers in such an approach, for if only orthodox means of expression are protected, many of our most poignant,
imaginative, and dramatic means of expression will be left
unprotected.21 0
D.

Discrimination Against Speech

Content-neutral restrictions generally fall into one of two categories: either they expressly restrict only communicative activities,
or they expressly restrict only noncommunicative activities but
have an incidental effect on free speech.2 1 The first category is illustrated by laws that expressly prohibit leafletting, ban billboards,
and limit political contributions. The second category is illustrated
by laws that prohibit the destruction of draft cards (as applied to
an individual who burns a draft card as a symbolic expression of
protest against the draft), ban racial discrimination (as applied to
a racist political organization that excludes blacks), and forbid
speeding (as applied to a reporter in a rush to make a deadline).
To what extent, if any, does this categorization affect content-neutral analysis? In exploring this question, I will begin with laws that
expressly restrict only communicative activities, and I will then
turn in part IV-E to those laws that only incidentally restrict free
speech.
In Martin v. City of Struthers, the Court invalidated an ordinance that declared it unlawful for "any person distributing handbills . . . to ring the door bell, sound the door knocker, or otherwise summon the inmate . . of any residence to the door for the
purpose of receiving such handbills. ' 21 2 The ordinance was
designed to protect "householders from annoyance, including in210 Ely, 88 Harv. L. Rev. at 1489 (cited in note 22). See Tribe, American Constitutional
Law at 685 n.12 (cited in note 46).
"I Some content-neutral restrictions-such as, say, one prohibiting all "speeches, bicy-

cle riding, and baliplaying" in public parks-expressly restrict both communicative and
noncommunicative activities. Such laws, of course, share some of the characteristics of each
of the categories discussed in the text. The extent to which laws in this category resemble
laws in the first or second category depends upon the proportion of communicative to
noncommunicative activities.
212 319 U.S. at 142.
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trusion upon the hours of rest."21' 3 Two characteristics of this ordinance are relevant to the present inquiry: it expressly restricts only
communicative activities, and it does so in an underinclusive manner. The ordinance is underinclusive because it restricts the communicative activity of distributing handbills but does not restrict
noncommunicative activities, such as the door-to-door selling of
pots and pans, that similarly threaten the asserted governmental
interest in protecting "householders from annoyance. ' 21 4 Such underinclusiveness raises the spectre of governmental discrimination
against a constitutional right, and it also impeaches the substantiality of the governmental interest said to support the restriction of
speech.
Underinclusiveness is a common concern of first amendment
analysis. In Police Department v. Mosley, 215 for example, the
Court, emphasizing underinclusiveness, invalidated a Chicago ordinance that prohibited picketing within 150 feet of a school building
while the school was in session, except for "peaceful picketing of
any school involved in a labor dispute." The Court explained that,
if "peaceful labor picketing is permitted, there is no justification
for prohibiting all nonlabor picketing," for peaceful nonlabor picketing "is obviously no more disruptive than 'peaceful' labor picketing." 2116 Similarly, in Erznoznik v. Jacksonville,1 7 the Court invalidated an ordinance that prohibited drive-in movie theatres from
exhibiting films containing nudity if the movie screen was visible
from a public street. The Court explained that the ordinance was
"strikingly underinclusive" because there was "no reason to think
that a wide variety of other scenes in the customary screen diet,
ranging from soap opera to violence, would be any less distracting
2 18
to the passing motorist.
As in Mosley and Erznoznik, the underinclusiveness in Martin
impeaches the substantiality of the government's asserted justifica-

213
214

Id. at 144.
Of course, to the extent that commercial speech is protected by the first amend-

ment, even selling pots and pans might be treated as a communicative activity. See Va.
Pharmacy Bd. v. Va.Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762-65 (1976). However, the Court's
approach to commercial speech following Virginia Pharmacy has recognized that the government has considerable power to regulate commercial speech. See, e.g., Central Hudson
Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561-66 (1980) (even commercial speech
that is neither misleading nor concerns unlawful activity may be regulated if the regulation
is no more extensive than necessary to directly advance a substantial government interest).
2-5408 U.S. 92, 93 (1972).
216 Id. at 100.
217 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
218 Id. at 214-15. See also Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
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tion for restricting speech. That is, the exclusion of door-to-door
salesmen in Martin calls into question the substantiality of the
government's commitment to protecting householders from
"'annoyance."
The more difficult question is whether the underinclusiveness
in Martin should elevate the standard of review. Unlike the ordinances invalidated in Mosley and Erznoznik, the ordinance in
Martin was content-neutral. Martin thus raises the question
whether content-neutral discrimination against communicative activity elevates the standard of review to the same degree as content-based discrimination.2 19 On the one hand, it seems clear that
content-based discrimination poses special dangers to the system
of free expression that are not posed by content-neutral discrimination against communicative activity. A content-neutral discrimination against communicative activity, for example, does not distort public debate as does a content-based restriction. On the other
hand, given the special status of constitutional rights, it seems
clear that "the government ought to treat first amendment activities as being at least as valuable as other privately chosen activities. '220 Thus, the government should be required to justify the underinclusiveness of any law that restricts communicative but not
analogous noncommunicative activity. This might be accomplished
either by elevating the standard of review for the challenged law as
a whole, or by undertaking a separate and distinct inquiry focusing
on the government's justification for treating communicative activity less favorably than analogous noncommunicative activity.
For the most part, the Court has taken a hard line on discrimination against communicative activity, although not nearly as
hard a line as it has taken on content-based discrimination. In
Martin, for example, Justice Frankfurter noted that "door-knocking and bell-ringing by professed peddlers" may destroy the city
inhabitants' opportunities for "sleep and refreshment," but that
the challenged ordinance "merely penalizes the distribution of
22 2
'literature.' 221 Similarly, in Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim,

"I

For an affirmative answer, see Baker, 78 N.W. U. L. Rev. at 957-61 (cited in note

220

Id. at 958.

54).

21 319 U.S. at 153 (separate opinion). The majority in Martin, by striking down the

ordinance, implicitly rejected Justice Frankfurter's argument that the ordinance could be
sustained even though it penalized the distribution of literature because "those in whose
keeping is the peace of the City of Struthers" could conceivably have concluded that distributors of literature were "the particular source of mischief." See id. at 154. The Court, in
other words, was not prepared to adopt so deferential an approach to the issue of
underinclusiveness.
222 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
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which invalidated an ordinance excluding all commercial live entertainment from the Borough, the Court rejected the contention
that the ordinance was justified by the Borough's interest in avoiding "the problems that may be associated with live entertainment,
such as parking, trash, police protection, and medical facilities."
The Court noted that the Borough had "presented no evidence,
and it is not immediately apparent as a matter of experience, that
live entertainment poses problems of this nature more significant
than those associated with various permitted [activities] ."223 And
in Minneapolis Star,224 which invalidated a special tax on publications, the Court explained that although the government "can subject newspapers to generally applicable economic regulations without creating constitutional problems," differential taxation of the
press "suggests that the goal of the regulation is not unrelated to
suppression of expression" and "places such a burden on the interests protected by the First Amendment" that it is invalid unless
necessary to achieve "a counterbalancing interest of compelling
5
importance.

'22

Thus, in Schad and Minneapolis Star, and implicitly in Martin, the Court gave considerable weight to the underinclusiveness
of content-neutral restrictions that expressly discriminated against
communicative activity, subjecting such restrictions to an elevated
standard of review.
In two recent decisions, however, the Court has departed from
this approach. In Members of the City Council of the City of Los
Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent,226 the Court held that an ordinance prohibiting the posting of signs on public property was justified by what the Court termed the city's "weighty" interest "in
eliminating visual clutter.

'227

As Justice Brennan observed in dis-

sent, however, for the city to establish that it was not discriminating against communicative activity and that its aesthetic interest
was substantial, it should "have to demonstrate that it is pursuing
its goal of eliminating visual clutter in a serious and comprehensive
manner," that it is pursuing this goal through means "other than
its ban on signs," and that at least some of these other means "do
not entail the restriction of speech" and parallel the ban on signs
Id. at 73.
460 U.S. 575.
225 Id. at 581, 585.
223
224

2 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
221 Id. at 806.
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"in their stringency, geographical scope, and aesthetic focus. '') 2
The Court, however, exercised only the most cursory judicial oversight. It upheld the ordinance without any inquiry of the sort undertaken in Martin, Schad, or Minneapolis Star.
As a doctrinal matter, Vincent may be explained on the
ground that the Court viewed the ordinance as only a modest regulation of nonpublic forum public property. It thus applied its
highly deferential standard of review. This is unsatisfactory, however, because unjustified underinclusiveness should invalidate even
a modest content-neutral restriction, 229 because the Court's analysis of nonpublic forum public property is itself unsatisfactory,2 30
and because the restriction in Vincent, like the restrictions in
Martin and Schad, constituted a substantial limitation on an important means of expression. In such circumstances, the underinclusiveness of the restriction upheld in Vincent called for closer
23 1
scrutiny.
More recently, in Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,2 s2 the
Court upheld an ordinance prohibiting any "adult motion picture
theater" from locating within 1,000 feet of any residential zone,
single- or multiple-family dwelling, church, or park, or within one
mile of any school. The ordinance was designed to prevent the
"secondary effects" of such theaters on surrounding neighborhoods. 3 s The Court upheld the ordinance despite the fact that it
did not restrict other businesses, such as adult bookstores, bars,
massage parlors, pool halls, liquor stores, and so on, that produce
"secondary effects" similar to those produced by adult theaters. 3 4
The Court, treating the ordinance as content-neutral, 23 5 explained
that the ordinance was not impermissibly underinclusive for two
reasons: the parties challenging the ordinance had failed to prove
that any other adult businesses were located in the city; and there
was no basis for assuming that the city would not in the future
"amend its ordinance to include other kinds of adult businesses"

128

Id. at 829.

22 Consider, for example, a law prohibiting any person from destroying a draft card as

a means of expression, or a law prohibiting any person from making loud noises during the
course of any demonstration on the grounds of the county jail (where other noisy activities
are not prohibited).
23 See part IV-B above (notes 159-91 and accompanying text).
23 For further analysis and criticism of this aspect of Vincent, see Quadres, 37 Hastings L. J. at 474-78 (cited in note 128).
.2 106 S.Ct. 925, 927 (1986).
:3

Id. at 929.

24

See id. at 934 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See part IV-F below (notes 270-81 and accompanying text).

23"
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that "produce the same kinds of secondary effects as adult thea237
ters. '236 Citing the passage in Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.
that authorizes the government to undertake reforms "one step at
a time," the Court carried over to first amendment analysis one of
the most highly deferential components of traditional rational basis review. The contrast between Renton, on the one hand, and
Martin, Schad, and Minneapolis Star, on the other, is striking. In
sum, although the Court has generally taken care to guard against
laws that discriminate against communicative activity, Vincent
and Renton stand as two recent and disturbing exceptions to this
general approach.
It is important to note that not all laws that expressly restrict
only communicative activities are underinclusive. To the contrary,
in many instances communicative activities are the only activities
that pose the relevant harm. In such circumstances, the law's exclusive focus on communicative activities is unproblematic. For example, a law restricting political contributions does not discriminate against communicative activity, for noncommunicative
activity does not pose an analogous threat to the political process. 23 8 Similarly, a regulation prohibiting face-to-face interviews
between members of the press and individual prison inmates does
not discriminate against communicative activity, for noncommunicative activity does not pose an analogous threat to the government's interest in preventing the disciplinary problems that arise
when particular inmates become public figures. 239 And a law
prohibiting any person from displaying "any flag, banner, or device" on the public sidewalk surrounding the Supreme Court
building does not discriminate against communicative activity, for
noncommunicative activity does not pose an analogous threat to
the government's interest in preventing the appearance or reality
of improper influence on the Court. 40 In such cases, the fact that
the challenged law expressly restricts only communicative activity
does not impeach the government's justification for the law and

216106 S.Ct. at 931-32.
237348 U.S. 483, 488-89 (1955), cited in Renton, 106 S.Ct. at 932.
2 See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. 1. See also United States Civil Service Commission v.
National Association of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973) (upholding § 9(a) of the Hatch
Act, which prohibits certain federal employees from taking "an active part in political management or in political campaigns").
139See, e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
110 See, e.g., Grace, 461 U.S. at 182-83. See also Greer, 424 U.S. 828 (upholding a regulation excluding political speeches and demonstrations from a military base in order to preserve both the appearance and reality of the military's noninvolvement in partisan politics).
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should not elevate the standard of review. 241
E. Incidental Effects on Speech
A second category of content-neutral restrictions consists of
those laws that expressly restrict noncommunicative activities, but
have an incidental effect on free speech. The number of laws falling within this second category is virtually limitless. It includes, for
example, environmental and minimum wage laws that raise the
price of newspapers, thus dampening public debate; laws that convert public parks to parking lots, thus eliminating public forums;
and laws that tax income, thus reducing the amount of money individuals have to spend on expressive activities. At first glance, one
might conclude that such laws have so indirect and tangential an
effect on free expression that they should be beyond the scope of
first amendment review.
It is not so simple, however. Consider the following pairs of
regulations:
• A law that prohibits all bookstores in a certain area, and a law
that zones that area for residential use only;
• A law that prohibits all parades in order to prevent obstruction
of traffic, and a law that prohibits obstruction of traffic by any
means, including parades;
* A law that prohibits sound trucks in order to prevent excessive
noise, and a law that prohibits excessive noise, which in practice
bans among other things cars with defective mufflers, jackhammers, and sound trucks;
* A law that prohibits any person from destroying a draft card as
a means of expression, and a law that prohibits any person from
destroying a draft card, regardless of purpose;
" A law that prohibits any uninvited person from ringing the
doorbell of a home to distribute literature, and a law that prohibits any uninvited person from ringing the doorbell of a home
for any purpose;
" A law that prohibits reporters from wiretapping, and a law that
24 2
prohibits wiretapping.
The first example in each of these pairs expressly restricts
211 For examples of such laws, see text at notes 236-38 above.
242

(1985).

This list is derived in part from Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law 1169 n.12
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communicative activity and obviously raises a serious first amendment question. The second example in each pair has only an incidental effect on free expression. Should each of the second examples be beyond the scope of first amendment review? The difficulty
is that, as we have seen, the central concern of content-neutral
analysis is the extent to which content-neutral restrictions limit
the opportunities for free expression. The second example in each
pair has precisely the same restrictive effect as the first. How,
then, can we justify drawing so sharp a distinction between the
first and second examples in each pair?
I can imagine four arguments that might support such a distinction. First, one might argue that content-neutral analysis is not
primarily about restrictive effect at all. Rather, it is primarily
about discrimination against communicative activity. Under this
view, if a law does not discriminate against communicative activity,
it is beyond the scope of first amendment review. The difficulty
with this argument is that, although discrimination against communicative activity is a legitimate first amendment concern, it does
not seem sufficiently important to support the entire weight of
content-neutral analysis. Moreover, such a view would offer no
constitutional protection against laws that expressly restrict communicative activity, but are not underinclusive and thus do not
discriminate against free speech.243 Such an approach would significantly limit the protection of the first amendment.
Second, one might argue that the central concern of contentneutral analysis is not restrictive effect, but the probability of improper motivation-that is, the probability that the challenged restriction was motivated by a desire to suppress a particular point
of view. Under this view, the degree of scrutiny would turn not on
restrictive effect, but on the probability of improper motivation.
Laws that do not expressly restrict communicative activity, but
have only an incidental effect on free speech, are especially unlikely-because of their breadth-to be motivated by such considerations. Thus, under this view, such laws are beyond the scope of
first amendment review. The difficulty with this approach is that
although the probability of improper motivation is no doubt rele"4S
Of course, the line between laws that are and are not underinclusive is not perfect.
Underinclusiveness is a matter of degree. Viewed in this light, Vincent and Renton can be
seen as cases in which the Court (intentionally) understated the degree of underinclusiveness either because of its desire to avoid the difficulties of the inquiry into underinclusiveness (Vincent) or because of its antipathy towards the restricted speech (Renton).
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vant to content-neutral analysis, the correlation between improper
motivation and direct versus incidental restrictions of speech is not
strong enough to justify so sharp a distinction. Many direct restrictions rest on perfectly legitimate motivations; and some incidental
restrictions may be the product of improper motives, where, for
example, officials can predict that a neutral law will have a strong
incidental effect on communicative activities. Moreover, a concern
with the probability of improper motivation explains little, if any,
of the rest of content-neutral analysis.
Third, one might argue that because laws that have only an
incidental effect on free speech are not aimed at speech, but restrict a broader class of activities, they are likely to rest on more
substantial justifications than do laws that expressly restrict communicative activities. In the above illustrations, for example, the
governmental interest furthered by the second law of each pair is
arguably more substantial than the interest furthered by the first.
But even if this is so generally, it does not follow that the interests
supporting laws that have only an incidental effect on free expression are sufficiently substantial to outweigh their restrictive effect
on free expression. Moreover, if the governmental interest is more
substantial, this should be simply one factor in the Court's analysis
in favor of upholding the law. It should not free the law from
review.
Finally, one might argue that to extend content-neutral balancing to all laws that have only an incidental effect on free expression would open up a Pandora's box of judicial review. Under
this view, such inquiries would create a nightmare of judicial administration that would simply not be worth the cost.24 4 The difficulty with this approach is that some laws that have only an incidental effect on free expression may have a substantial restrictive
effect. Consider, for example, a law prohibiting the manufacture of
paper. The interest in administrative simplicity is weighty, but it
does not invariably outweigh the need to avoid substantial restrictions of free expression.
Thus, although these arguments have some force, they are not
sufficiently powerful, either singly or in combination, to support
the conclusion that laws having only an incidental effect on free
speech should be beyond the scope of first amendment review. The
potential restrictive effect of such laws is simply too great to disregard them entirely. The problem, then, is to decide how to analyze
244

See Schauer, 26 Wm. & Mary L, Rev. at 784 (cited in note 15).
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the problem of incidental effects.
In dealing with laws that have only an incidental effect on free
speech, the Court starts from the presumption that such laws raise
no first amendment issue. In Associated Press v. NLRB,245 for example, the Court held that the application to the Associated Press
of section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, which confers on
employees the right to organize and bargain collectively, did not
violate the first amendment:
The business of the Associated Press is not immune from regulation because it is an agency of the press. The publisher of a
newspaper has no special immunity from the application of
general laws. He has no special privilege to invade the rights
and liberties of others. He must answer for libel. He may be
punished for contempt of court. He is subject to the anti-trust
laws. Like others he must pay equitable and nondiscriminatory taxes on his business. The regulation here in question has
no relation whatever to the impartial distribution of news. s46
Following Associated Press, the Court has held that the appli-

247
cation of general regulatory schemes, such as the Sherman Act,
the Fair Labor Standards Act,248 and various fire and health code

regulations, 4 9 to individuals or organizations exercising first
amendment rights does not raise a first amendment question.250 In
1986 the Court built further on Associated Press, holding in Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc. 25 1 that no first amendment question was

raised by the application to an adult book store of a municipal ordinance requiring the closing for a period of one year of any place
of business found to be a place of prostitution.
Although reaffirming the presumption that laws having only
an incidental effect on free expression are not subject to first
amendment review, the Court in Cloud Books refined its analysis
of "incidental effects." First, the Court observed that incidental restrictions that have a highly disproportionate impact on groups or
301 U.S. 103 (1937).
Id. at 132-33 (footnotes omitted).
247 Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969).
248 Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
249 See Arcara v. Cloud Books, 106 S.Ct. 3172, 3177 (1986).
250 See Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (first amendment does not require police to use a
245
246

subpoena rather than a search warrant to obtain information from the press); Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (first amendment does not create a newsman's privilege for confidential sources that exempts newsman from the general obligation of all citizens to turn
over relevant information to a grand jury).
251 106 S.Ct. 3172 (1986).
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individuals engaged in first amendment activity do not escape first
amendment review. For example, a law prohibiting the manufacture of loudspeakers or imposing a special tax on the sale of newsprint would fall so heavily on communicative as compared to
noncommunicative activity that its effect on free expression could
hardly be deemed "incidental." The Court recognized that such
laws could not logically be exempt from first amendment
2 52
scrutiny.
Second, the Court observed in Cloud Books that laws having
only an incidental effect on free expression cannot escape first
amendment review if they penalize expressive activity. 253 Indeed,
the Court has consistently held that laws that penalize expressive
activity are unconstitutional unless they meet the standard articulated in O'Brien-that is, unless they are "within the constitutional power of the Government," they further "an important or
substantial governmental interest," the "governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression," and the restriction is "no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
2' 54
interest.
The Court explained in Cloud Books that cases like O'Brien
and Community for Creative Non-Violence-cases where incidental restrictions penalize expressive activity-are distinguishable
from cases like Associated Press and Cloud Books because in the
former cases it was expressive activity that "drew the legal remedy. '255 That is, in O'Brien it was the expressive act of burning a
draft card, and in Community for Creative Non-Violence it was
the expressive act of sleeping in a public park, that triggered the
penalty; whereas in Cloud Books it was the nonexpressive act of
prostitution, and in Associated Press the nonexpressive failure to
bargain collectively, that triggered the penalty.
252 It is noteworthy that the one example the Court offered of this phenomenon in

Cloud Books, Minneapolis Star, was not an incidental effect at all. To the contrary, the law
at issue in Minneapolis Star imposed a special tax on the cost of paper and ink products
used "in producing a publication." 460 U.S. at 578 n.2. Although a special tax on paper and
ink might be an incidental restriction that has a highly disproportionate effect on the press,
a tax that applies to only the press is hardly incidental. For another opinion mischaracterizing a restriction as only "incidental," see Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 808 (characterizing as an "incidental" restriction on expression an ordinance that prohibits the posting of
signs on public property).
252 As examples of review in such cases, see O'Brien, 391 U.S. 369 (prohibition on burning draft card, as applied to an individual who burned his card as symbolic protest against
draft); and Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (prohibition on sleeping in
public parks, as applied to demonstrators who did so to dramatize plight of homeless).
2
O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377; Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at 294.
255 Cloud Books, 106 S.Ct. at 3177.
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It is not immediately apparent why this should matter. It may
be that a law that penalizes expressive activity, even if only incidentally, looks more like an "abridgment" of free speech than a
law that restricts free expression without penalizing expressive activity. It may also be that there is a greater risk of discriminatory
application when expressive activity triggers the penalty. And it
may be that the Cloud Books distinction is primarily an administrative device designed to cabin the circumstances in which incidental restrictions can raise first amendment questions. This, indeed, may be the most persuasive explanation of the distinction.
Cloud Books leaves two important questions unanswered.
First, do the two refinements recognized in Cloud Books exhaust
the circumstances in which the Court will review a law that has
only an incidental effect on free expression? And second, if a law
that has only an incidental effect on free expression is subject to
first amendment review, to what extent, if any, does the fact that
the restriction has only an incidental effect dilute the standard of
review?
With respect to the first of these questions, it seems clear either that Cloud Books does not exhaust the field or that in at least
some cases "expressive" activity is defined quite broadly. In
United States v. Albertini,2 56 for example, the Court applied the
O'Brien standard in upholding a federal statute prohibiting any
person from entering a military base after being ordered not to do
so, as applied to an individual who entered a base during an open
house in order to distribute leaflets. It was the defendant's reentry
onto the base, however, rather than his leafletting, that "drew the
legal remedy." The defendant presumably would have been punished even if he had reentered the base for a nonexpressive purpose. On the other hand, the defendant in fact entered the base for
an expressive purpose. In such circumstances, was it the expressive
leafletting or the nonexpressive reentry that "drew the legal remedy"? Because the Court undertook first amendment review, Albertini suggests either an expansion of the Cloud Books exceptions
or at least a very broad definition of "expressive" activity.
If the uncertainty were limited to cases like Albertini, where
first amendment review consists of the O'Brien standard, this issue
would be of little practical importance. For despite the lengths the
Court went to in Cloud Books to distinguish O'Brien, the O'Brien
standard, as we have seen, is highly deferential in application. It

256

472 U.S. 675 (1985).
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has never resulted in the invalidation of an incidental restriction of
speech.257 Thus, if the Cloud Books exception for laws that penalize expressive activity affects only cases like O'Brien, Community
for Creative Non-Violence, and Albertini, the dispute may as a
practical matter be of little consequence.258
In fact, however, the stakes are more substantial. For in at
least some cases involving incidental restrictions that have significant restrictive effects on free expression, the Court has applied a
more demanding standard of review. In Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 259 for example, the Court tested with intermediate scrutiny a law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex in any
"place of public accommodation," as applied to an organization
that refused to admit women as full voting members. Although the
Court noted that the law had only an incidental effect on the freedom of association and did "not aim at the suppression of
speech,

' 260

it invoked intermediate scrutiny because the law seri-

ously interfered with the "internal structure" of
the association by
2 61
forcing it to accept members it did not desire.
Similarly, in NAACP v. Alabama,6 2 the Court used strict
scrutiny to test a state law, as applied to the NAACP, that required any foreign corporation seeking to do business in the state
to provide the state with certain information, including the names
and addresses of its members. Although the Court conceded that
the challenged statute "may appear to be totally unrelated to protected liberties," it explained that the fact that Alabama "has
taken no direct action . . . to restrict the right of petitioner's

members to associate freely, does not end inquiry into the effect of
the production order," for in "the domain of these indispensable
liberties," unconstitutional abridgments, "even though unintended,
may inevitably follow from varied forms of governmental action. 2 63 After concluding that disclosure of NAACP membership
could have a "substantial" deterrent effect on the members' first
amendment rights, the Court held that, for the law to pass constitutional muster, the "'subordinating interest of the State must be
compelling.' ",264
2"1 See text accompanying notes 14-23 above.
"5

See Schauer, 26 Win. & Mary L. Rev. at 787-88 (cited in note 15).

25 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
240

Id. at 625.

Is Id.
242 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
24 Id. at 461 (citations omitted).
Id. at 462, 463, quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 265 (1957) (Frank-
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Finally, in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,2 65 the
Court tested with strict scrutiny a court order closing a courtroom
to the public during the testimony of a minor victim in a criminal
trial for rape, as applied to a member of the press who sought to
observe the victim's testimony. Noting that "the criminal trial historically has been open to the press and general public," the Court
concluded that to justify a denial of access to such proceedings the
government must demonstrate "that the denial is necessitated by a
compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve
'266
that interest.
In terms of the Cloud Books exception for incidental restrictions that penalize expressive activity, it should be noted that
neither Jaycees nor NAACP v. Alabama nor Globe clearly involved a situation in which expressive activity "drew the legal remedy." In Jaycees, it was the exclusion of women that drew the legal
remedy. In NAACP v. Alabama, it was the refusal to turn over the
membership lists that drew the legal remedy. And in Globe, it was
unauthorized presence at the trial that would have drawn the penalty, had a legal remedy been drawn. It is possible, however, to
argue that each of these cases involved a penalty on expressive activity. For example, one might argue that in Jaycees the exclusion
of women is expressive activity because it defines the organization
ideologically and is a symbolic expression of policy; that in
NAACP v. Alabama the relevant penalty is the chilling effect
caused by disclosure; and that in Globe the presence of reporters at
criminal trials is part of the news gathering function and, hence,
"expressive" activity. Each of these arguments, however, is
strained. Viewed cumulatively, these cases seem to suggest that the
Court will undertake first amendment review when an incidental
restriction has a significant effect on free expression.
This, then, brings us to the second question left open by
Cloud Books: If an incidental restriction is subject to first amendment review, to what extent, if any, does the fact that the effect is
only incidental dilute the standard of review? The two lines of
cases we have already examined suggest that incidental effect does
not dilute the standard. In O'Brien, Community for Creative NonViolence, and Albertini, the Court tested incidental restrictions
having only a modest effect on public debate with the same stan-

furter, J., concurring).
265 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
26 Id. at 605, 607. See also Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 106 S.Ct. 2735
(1986); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
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dards of review it ordinarily applies to modest content-neutral restrictions. And in Jaycees, NAACP v. Alabama, and Globe, the
Court tested incidental restrictions having a significant effect on
public debate with the same, more demanding standards that it
ordinarily applies to significant content-neutral restrictions.
This is not to say, however, that an incidental restriction having a particular level of restrictive effect on public debate is necessarily invalid whenever a nonincidental restriction having that
same effect is invalid. For example, although the government cannot prohibit all speeches in public parks, this does not mean that it
cannot sell its parks-even though the restrictive effects of the two
actions on free expression are identical. This is so, not because the
sale is tested by a less demanding standard of review, but because
the government's interest in selling its parks may be sufficiently
weighty, as compared to its interest in prohibiting speeches in the
parks it owns, to withstand the ordinary standard of review. Similarly, in evaluating the prohibition on live commercial entertainment in Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim,the Court responded to
the Borough's contention that it could have "chosen to eliminate
all commercial uses within its boundaries" by noting that it "must
assess the exclusion of live entertainment in light of the commercial uses Mount Ephraim allows, not in light of what the Borough
might have done. 2' 6 The Court added, however, that its decision
did "not establish that every unit of local government . . . must
provide a commercial zone in which live entertainment is
'268
permitted.
At the same time, however, as NAACP v. Alabama and Globe
illustrate, this does not mean that incidental restrictions are never
invalid. In some cases, the interests furthered by even an incidental restriction may be insufficient to justify the restriction of free
expression. Consider, for example, a law prohibiting all noise in a
public park louder than the volume of ordinary conversation, as
applied to an individual who wants to make a public speech; a law
banning all obstruction of ordinary street traffic, as applied to an
organization that wants to have a parade; and a law forbidding any
uninvited person to ring a doorbell, as applied to a person who
wants to distribute literature door to door. A law that expressly
prohibits speeches in public parks, parades on public streets, or
door-to-door distribution of literature is unconstitutional. What,
then, of my hypothetical laws, which have the same restrictive ef267

452 U.S. 61, 75 (1981).

28 Id. at 75 n.18.
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fects, but are justified on somewhat different, or at least less underinclusive, bases? In my view, these laws, although less problematic than laws directed expressly at communicative activity, are
nonetheless invalid because the governmental interests furthered
are insufficiently weighty to justify such significant restrictions on
these traditional means of free expression. Although the Court has
never directly addressed these precise issues, it has indicated that
at least in the public forum context, the "streets, sidewalks, parks,
and other similar public places are so historically associated with
the exercise of First Amendment rights that access to them for the
purpose of exercising such rights cannot constitutionally be denied
broadly and absolutely."26
In sum, then, the Court's approach to incidental restrictions
reflects an effort to avoid endless inquiries into incidental effect
while at the same time invalidating those restrictions that most seriously threaten free expression. The general presumption is that
incidental restrictions do not raise a question of first amendment
review. The presumption is waived, however, whenever an incidental restriction either has a highly disproportionate impact on free
expression or directly penalizes expressive activity. And the latter
exception is applied quite liberally whenever the challenged restriction significantly limits the opportunities for free expression.
It is an uneasy but not unprincipled compromise.
F. Communicative Impact
As noted earlier, one of the troubling aspects of content-based
restrictions is that they usually are designed to restrict speech because of "a fear of how people will react to what the speaker is
saying."2 ' This motivation is constitutionally disfavored because it
usually rests either on the assumption that citizens cannot make
wise decisions if they are exposed to the expression, or on the assumption that the expression will offend others and perhaps lead
to a hostile audience response. Laws that restrict
speech for such
271
reasons are presumptively unconstitutional.
In some cases, the government defends content-based restrictions in terms that are unrelated to communicative impact. Should
such restrictions-for this reason-be treated as content-neutral,
rather than content-based, despite the fact that they are content269 Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391

U.S. 308, 315 (1968).
270 Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 111 (cited in note 46).
271 See Stone, Content Regulation, 25 Wm & Mary L. Rev. at 207-17 (cited in note 1).
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based of their face? 2 2
In Renton, the Court upheld a zoning ordinance that restricted the exhibition of motion pictures characterized "by an emphasis on matter depicting, describing or relating to 'specified sexual activities' or 'specified anatomical areas.' ",273 Although the
ordinance was explicitly content-based on its face, the Court characterized and analyzed it as "content-neutral" because it was defended not in terms of the communicative impact of the restricted
effects of such theaters on
speech, but in terms of "the 2secondary
74
community.
the surrounding
This is a disturbing, incoherent, and unsettling precedent. It is
true that the ordinance in Renton was not defended in terms of its
communicative impact-at least in the sense that the city's concerns did not implicate either of the constitutionally disfavored
justifications ordinarily associated with communicative impact.
But the Court had never before Renton suggested that the absence
of a constitutionally disfavored justification is in itself a justification for treating an expressly content-based restriction as if it were
content-neutral. To the contrary, with the single exception of Renton, the Court in such circumstances has always invoked the stringent standards of content-based review.
To cite just three of many possible examples, in Police Department v. Mosley, perhaps the seminal decision distinguishing
content-based and content-neutral restrictions, the Court treated
as content-based an ordinance prohibiting all picketing near a
school, except for peaceful labor picketing, even though the city
sought to defend the ordinance not in terms of communicative impact, but on the ground that nonlabor picketers are more prone to
violence than labor picketers. 7 5 Similarly, in City of Madison
Joint School District No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
272 The converse issue can also arise. That is, although the government ordinarily defends content-neutral restrictions in terms unrelated to communicative impact, in some instances it defends such restrictions by reference to communicative impact. This would be so,
for example, when an individual whose speech triggers a hostile audience response is prosecuted for provoking a breach of the peace. Because breach of the peace statutes do not
usually single out particular messages for restriction, but define prohibited speech in terms
of prohibited effects, they are content-neutral on their face. Such laws turn in application
on communicative impact, however, and are defended by a justification based on intolerance. Accordingly, such restrictions may appropriately trigger more stringent standards of
review thancother content-neutral restrictions. This issue is explored in depth in Stone,
Content Regulation, 25 Wm & Mary L. Rev. at 234-39 (cited in note 1).
273 106 S.Ct. 925, 927 (1986).
27 Id. at 929 (original emphasis).
275 408 U.S. 92,

100 & n.7 (1972).
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Commission, the Court treated as content-based a commission order prohibiting the school board from hearing nonunion teachers
on matters subject to collective bargaining, even though the commission defended its order not in terms of communicative impact,
but on the ground that the order was necessary to prevent "'chaos
in labor management [sic] relations.' ,,276 And in New York v. Fer-

ber, the Court treated as content-based a law prohibiting "child
pornography," even though the government defended the law not
in terms of communicative impact, but on the ground that the law
was necessary to
protect children who participate in "sexual
7
performances."

27

These decisions make perfect sense. Even in the absence of a
constitutionally disfavored justification, expressly content-based
restrictions pose the two other dangers ordinarily associated with
content-based restrictions: they expressly distort public debate in a
content-differential manner, and they pose an especially high risk
of improper motivation. These concerns are sufficiently serious in
themselves
to trigger the stringent standards of content-based
8
2
review. 7

If taken seriously, and extended to other contexts, the Court's
transmogrification in Renton of an expressly content-based restriction into one that is content-neutral threatens to undermine the
very foundation of the content-based/content-neutral distinc276 429

U.S. 167, 173 (1976), quoting City of Madison Joint School District No. 8 v.

Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 69 Wis.2d 200, 212, 231 N.W.2d 206, 213 (1975).
27 458 U.S. 747, 751, 763-64 (1982). See also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981)
(university ban on use of its facilities "for purposes of religious worship or religious teaching" held an impermissible content-based exclusion of religious speech as applied to a student religious group; no compelling state interest in maintaining strict separation of church
and state because establishment clause would not bar a policy of equal access to the facilities); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980) (protecting the privacy of private homes held
insufficient to justify a state ban on picketing of residences or dwellings that exempted
peaceful picketing of a place of employment from the prohibition); Greer, 424 U.S. 828 (goal
of keeping official military activities from "the reality and appearance of acting as a handmaiden for partisan political causes or candidates" sufficient to justify Fort Dix's limits on
speeches, demonstrations, and leafletting on military property); Lehman, 418 U.S. 298 (city
desire to limit advertising on public transit vehicles to uncontroversial commercial and public service messages insufficient to justify ban on political ads); United States v. Robel, 389
U.S. 258 (1967) (Congress's desire to safeguard national security insufficient to justify effect
on freedom of association from statutory requirement that members of Communist Party
register with U.S. government).
278 This is not to say that the presence or absence of a constitutionally disfavored justification is constitutionally irrelevant. To the contrary, this factor may play an important
role in deciding how to analyze a law that is content-neutral on its face, but turns in application on communicative impact. See Stone, Content Regulation, 25 Wm & Mary L. Rev. at
234-39 (cited in note 1).
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tion 17 This would in turn erode the coherence and predictability
of first amendment doctrine. 280 One can only hope that this aspect
of Renton is soon forgotten.2 8 1
CONCLUSION

While the use of different standards of review for contentbased and content-neutral restrictions can be troubling, the content-based/content-neutral distinction is justified by several considerations. Content-based restrictions are more likely than content-neutral restrictions to raise concerns about distortion of
public debate, improper motivation, and communicative impact.
Moreover, extension of the strict standards of content-based review to content-neutral restrictions would hamstring regulations
that are practical and necessary exercises of state power and lead
ultimately to a dilution of the strict standards of content-based
review.
The Court's analysis of content-neutral restrictions is designed
primarily to assure that adequate opportunities for free expression
remain open and available. This is essential for the preservation of
a vital and robust public debate. The Court's analysis is also
shaped, however, by such secondary considerations as disparate
impact, public property, tradition, discrimination against speech,
incidental effect, and communicative impact. The result is a complex and at times patchwork set of outcomes and doctrines.
Although the Court's content-neutral jurisprudence follows a
relatively predictable pattern, the Court has failed to make sufficiently explicit the considerations that shape its analysis and yield
its results. This has needlessly exacerbated the uncertainty that is
already inherent in the balancing approach the Court uses in reviewing content-neutral restrictions. The time has come for the
Court to take a more structured approach. It should make clear

279 It should be noted that there were alternative arguments the Court could have
made in Renton that might more sensibly have supported a dilution of the standard of
review. See Stone, Content Regulation, 25 Wm & Mary L. Rev. at 242-44 (cited in note 1);
Stone, Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 81 (cited in note 1).
2 0 For discussion of a related issue in the context of pornography, see Stone, AntiPornography Legislation, 9 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol. at 469-72 (cited in note 1).
281 It is noteworthy that in Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1986), which involved the constitutionality of a federal statute prohibiting any hostile demonstration
within 500 feet of a foreign embassy in order to comply with the requirements of international law, the court of appeals, recognizing the uncertain status of this aspect of Renton,
declined to rely upon it despite its potential application to the case at hand. See id. at 1469
n.15.
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both the lines between content-based and content-neutral review
and the three-tiered approach it takes toward content-neutral restrictions on speech. The result will be a more stable jurisprudence
that will serve both to protect the opportunities for free expression
and to safeguard those neutral laws that are truly necessary to the
public order.

